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CHEVRON DEFERENCE AND 
EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION* 
WILLIAM S. DODGE** 
What happens when Chevron deference meets the presumption 
against extraterritoriality? Many statutes with potential 
extraterritorial applications are administered by federal agencies. 
Should courts determine the geographic scope of such statutes for 
themselves by applying the presumption? Or should courts defer to 
reasonable agency interpretations of geographic scope? Are 
agencies free to change their interpretations of a statute’s 
geographic scope or to interpret that scope differently than courts 
have? 
This Article argues that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
should be incorporated at step two of the Chevron framework. 
Courts should defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a 
statute’s geographic scope if the agency has considered the 
normative values that underlie the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, not all 
normative canons are applied at Chevron step one; moreover, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality never has been. Agency 
interpretations of geographic scope should receive deference 
because agencies are likely to have a better understanding than 
courts of statutory purposes, regulatory options, and potential 
conflicts with foreign interests. Agencies can also calibrate 
extraterritorial regulation to maximize effectiveness and minimize 
conflicts far better than courts. Finally, this Article argues that 
agencies may change their minds about geographic scope and that 
they are free to depart from lower court decisions applying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and perhaps even from 
Supreme Court decisions applying the presumption. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We live in a world where transactions, information, pollution, and 
many other things cross national borders. In such a world, nations often 
have a legitimate interest in regulating persons or conduct outside their 
territories. Many U.S. statutes clearly indicate that they apply 
extraterritorially.1 Others say nothing about their geographic scope.2 
 
 1. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§	78dd-1 to -3 (2012) (prohibiting 
bribery of foreign officials); Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§	2000e(f), -1(b), -1(c)(2) (2012) 
(extending Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination to U.S. citizens employed in 
foreign countries, but exempting discrimination required by foreign law and discrimination by 
foreign companies not controlled by U.S. companies). 
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When U.S. courts have to determine the scope of a statute for 
themselves, they typically employ a presumption against 
extraterritoriality.3 
But sometimes a statute that says nothing about its geographic 
scope also gives an administrative agency authority to interpret the 
statute. In a few instances, Congress expressly delegates to an 
administrative agency the authority to determine the geographic scope 
of the statute.4 In most instances, Congress does not, and whatever 
authority the agency might have to determine the statute’s scope is a 
function of its more general interpretive authority. Under Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,5 courts generally 
must defer to a reasonable interpretation of a statute by an agency 
exercising delegated lawmaking authority.6 And under Skidmore v. Swift 
& Co.,7 even when an agency is not exercising delegated lawmaking 
authority, courts may defer to agency interpretations to the extent they 
are persuasive.8 Where does the presumption against extraterritoriality 
fit into this framework of deference? Are questions of geographic scope 
different from other questions of statutory interpretation, or should they 
be treated similarly? 
These questions have significant implications for extraterritorial 
regulation. For decades, agency regulations have defined the geographic 
scope of the registration requirements under the Securities Act9 and the 
premerger notification requirements of Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
 
 2. See, e.g., Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §	18a 
(2012); Securities Act of 1933 §	5, 15 U.S.C. §	77e (2012). 
 3. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100–01 (2016) 
(applying presumption against extraterritoriality to determine the geographic scope of 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act’s (“RICO’s”) substantive provisions 
and private right of action); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) 
(applying presumption against extraterritoriality to determine the geographic scope of 
Securities Exchange Act §	10(b)); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 
(1991) (applying presumption against extraterritoriality to determine the geographic scope of 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prior to its 1991 amendment). 
 4. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act §	30(a), 15 U.S.C. §	78dd(a) (2012) (giving the 
Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) authority to make rules governing certain 
transactions “on an exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”). 
 5. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 6. Id. at 844 (“[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision 
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”). 
 7. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 8. Id. at 140 (noting that an agency’s interpretations “constitute a body of experience 
and informed judgment” that may have the “power to persuade”); see also United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (holding that an agency interpretation not entitled to 
deference under Chevron is still “eligible to claim respect according to its persuasiveness” 
under Skidmore). 
 9. Regulation S, 17 C.F.R. §§	230.901–.905 (2016). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 911 (2017) 
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Improvements Act (“HSR”).10 More recently, agency regulations have 
defined the geographic scope of the so-called “Volcker Rule” under the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank Act”), which prohibits banks from proprietary trading.11 If 
questions of geographic scope must be decided exclusively by courts 
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, these regulations 
may be invalid. 
If, on the other hand, agency interpretations of geographic scope 
are entitled to deference under Chevron and Skidmore, then court 
decisions applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to agency-
administered statutes may be merely provisional.12 In Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd.,13 for example, the Supreme Court of the 
United States applied the presumption to hold that §	10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act14 extends only to fraud involving transactions in 
the United States.15 If Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) 
interpretations of §	10(b)’s geographic scope are entitled to Chevron 
deference, the SEC might use its delegated rulemaking authority 
effectively to reverse Morrison.16 
Courts are divided on how the presumption against 
extraterritoriality fits into the Chevron-Skidmore framework. One 
district court has held that the presumption is a traditional tool of 
 
 10. 16 C.F.R. §§	802.50–.52 (2016). 
 11. 12 C.F.R. §	44.6(e) (2016). 
 12. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 
(2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction 
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for 
agency discretion.”). For a prescient article discussing this question, see Kenneth A. 
Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272 (2002). 
 13. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 14. 15 U.S.C. §	78j(b) (2012). 
 15. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273. For further discussion of Morrison, see infra Section III.D. 
 16. See infra Section VI.B. This Article also suggests that the SEC might use its 
regulatory authority in a more limited way to solve other problems that have arisen after 
Morrison. For example, Joseph Grundfest has raised the concern that Morrison may 
effectively preclude aftermarket buyers from bringing claims under §	11 of the Securities Act 
and proposes a number of steps the SEC might take to address the problem. See Joseph A. 
Grundfest, Morrison, the Restricted Scope of Securities Act Section 11 Liability, and Prospects 
for Regulatory Reform, 41 J. CORP. L. 1, 48–69 (2015). While consideration of §	11 is beyond 
the scope of this Article, its analysis suggests that the SEC could address this problem much 
more directly by using its authority under §	19 of the Securities Act to define the geographic 
scope of §	11, even if its interpretation departs from Morrison’s. See infra note 339 and 
accompanying text (discussing Securities Act §	19 in the context of Regulation S). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 911 (2017) 
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statutory interpretation to be applied at Chevron step one.17 Two circuits 
have suggested that an agency interpretation applying a statute 
extraterritorially might be entitled to deference under Chevron or 
Skidmore if the agency could point to some basis for that interpretation 
in the statute.18 And one circuit has suggested that an agency 
interpretation could be considered reasonable at Chevron step two if 
there were “some indication that the agency has considered the effect of 
the presumption against extraterritoriality	.	.	.	.”19 
Scholarly opinion is also divided. Some treat the presumption 
against extraterritoriality as a canon of construction to be applied at 
Chevron step one.20 Others have argued that the presumption should be 
applied at Chevron step two so that courts should defer to reasonable 
interpretations of a statute’s geographic scope by agencies exercising 
delegated lawmaking authority.21 Professor Cass Sunstein has been on 
both sides of the question. Initially, he suggested that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality “probably cannot be defeated by the agency’s 
contrary view.”22 More recently, in an article co-authored with Professor 
 
 17. Souryal v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., LLC, 847 F. Supp. 2d 835, 842 (E.D. Va. 
2012). 
 18. See Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is far from 
clear that an agency’s assertion that a statute has extraterritorial effect, unmoored from any 
plausible statutory basis for rebutting the presumption against extraterritoriality, should be 
given [Chevron] deference.”); Keller Found./Case Found. v. Tracy, 696 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir. 
2012) (“Because the Director cites no textual evidence of Congress’s clear intention to 
authorize the extraterritorial application of the Act, the Director’s interpretation lacks 
persuasive force [under Skidmore].”). 
 19. Validus Reinsurance, Ltd. v. United States, 786 F.3d 1039, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 20. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and Agency Norm-
Entrepreneurship, 115 YALE. L.J. 2623, 2629 & n.33 (2006) (referring to presumption against 
extraterritoriality as a “clear statement rule[] relevant to Step One”). For discussion of the 
Chevron framework, see infra Section I.A. 
 21. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 
649, 694 (2000) (arguing that the presumption against extraterritoriality “reflects a desire to 
push certain issues away from the courts, not a preference for congressional as opposed to 
Executive determination”); Zachary D. Clopton, Replacing the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1, 40 (2014) (noting that “the extraterritoriality question is 
exactly the sort of statutory ambiguity for which the [Chevron] doctrine was designed”); see 
also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: 
JURISDICTION §	203 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“If Congress has 
not spoken directly to the geographic scope of a statutory provision, courts in the United 
States must defer to a reasonable construction of the statute by an administering agency 
exercising delegated lawmaking authority.”). 
 22. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 
2114–15 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Law and Administration]; see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 333 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, 
Nondelegation Canons] (“[A]gencies are not permitted to apply statutes outside of the 
territorial borders of the United States. If statutes are to receive extraterritorial application, it 
must be as a result of a deliberate congressional judgment to this effect.” (footnote omitted)). 
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Eric Posner, Sunstein argued “that in cases in which the executive has 
adopted an interpretation via rulemaking or adjudication, or is 
otherwise entitled to deference under standard principles of 
administrative law, the executive’s interpretations should prevail over 
the comity doctrines,” the presumption against extraterritoriality among 
them.23 
This Article argues that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
is properly applied at Chevron step two and that courts must therefore 
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of a statute’s geographic 
scope.24 First, contrary to the conventional wisdom, not all canons of 
interpretation are applied at Chevron step one.25 Second, again contrary 
to the conventional wisdom, the Supreme Court has never applied the 
presumption against extraterritoriality at step one. Rather, it has 
suggested that the presumption should be incorporated at step two of 
the Chevron analysis.26 Third, and most important, agencies are in a far 
better position than courts to weigh and apply the normative values that 
 
 23. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE 
L.J. 1170, 1204 (2007). While this Article agrees with Posner and Sunstein about agency 
interpretations of geographic scope, it does not endorse Posner and Sunstein’s more 
expansive argument that courts should defer to the executive branch in applying comity 
doctrines outside the context of administrative law. See id. at 1205. To the contrary, I have 
argued that deference to case-specific determinations by the executive branch undermines 
both the rule of law and the foreign relations interests of the United States. See William S. 
Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2132–40 (2015). 
Chevron and Skidmore deference are not case-specific—rather, they establish interpretations 
of statutes that courts apply across all cases. 
 24. This argument is subject to the important limitation that the agency’s interpretation 
does not violate international law. Under the so-called Charming Betsy canon, “an act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains.” Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); 
see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: JURISDICTION §	205 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016) (“Where fairly 
possible, U.S. courts construe federal statutes to avoid conflict with international law 
governing jurisdiction to prescribe. Where a federal statute cannot be so construed, the 
federal statute is controlling as a matter of U.S. law.”). Some scholars have taken the position 
that Chevron deference with respect to the presumption against extraterritoriality should 
extend to the Charming Betsy canon as well. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 21, at 685–90; 
Clopton, supra note 21, at 44–45. I would distinguish the Charming Betsy canon on the ground 
that the President is constitutionally bound to obey international law under the Take Care 
Clause. See William S. Dodge, After Sosa: The Future of Customary International Law in the 
United States, 17 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 21, 34–38 (2009). At a minimum, 
because the constitutional authority of the executive branch to violate international law is not 
clearly established, an agency interpretation that violates international law should be 
reviewed at Chevron step one under the constitutional avoidance canon. See infra notes 96–98 
and accompanying text (discussing application of the constitutional avoidance canon at 
Chevron step one). 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See infra Part III. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 911 (2017) 
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underlie the presumption against extraterritoriality. Agencies are likely 
to have a better understanding of the statutory policy, the regulatory 
options available to effectuate that policy, and the degree of conflict 
with other countries that each option might cause. Agencies can also 
calibrate their interpretations to a far greater degree than courts in order 
to maximize the effectiveness of statutory policies while minimizing 
conflicts with other nations.27 
Beyond the practical implications of the question,28 this Article 
makes contributions in two distinct areas. First, it adds to the substantial 
literature on extraterritorial regulation in general and on the 
presumption against extraterritoriality in particular.29 While other 
articles have briefly considered the question of deference to agency 
interpretations of geographic scope,30 none have attempted such a 
comprehensive consideration. 
 
 27. See infra Part IV. This Article accords with recent literature arguing that questions of 
foreign relations law should be treated similarly to purely domestic questions. See generally 
Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380 (2015) (arguing that the Roberts Court no longer defers to the 
executive branch in foreign affairs law); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The 
Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015) (arguing that courts 
properly treat foreign relations issues like domestic issues). But it is also possible to argue for 
deference to administrative agencies from an exceptionalist perspective on the ground that 
foreign relations concerns make deference to the Executive particularly important. See, e.g., 
Bradley, supra note 21, at 693 (citing “general understandings regarding executive branch 
authority and expertise” in international relations); Posner & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1207 
(arguing that “the expertise rationale for deference to the executive is stronger in the foreign 
relations setting than in the traditional Chevron setting”). 
 28. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
 29. For articles discussing extraterritoriality in various contexts, see generally Roger P. 
Alford, The Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws: The United States and European 
Community Approaches, 33 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (1992); Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the 
Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1 (1992); Curtis A. Bradley, 
Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997); 
Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing 
Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 14 (2007); Anthony J. Colangelo, What 
Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1303 (2014); William S. Dodge, 
Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85 (1998); 
Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the 
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057 
(2009); Franklin A. Gevurtz, Determining Extraterritoriality, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 341 
(2014); John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351 
(2010); Jenny S. Martinez, New Territorialism and Old Territorialism, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
1387 (2014); Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110 (2010); Gerald L. Neuman, 
Extraterritoriality and the Interests of the United States in Regulating Its Own, 99 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1441 (2014); Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 815 (2009). 
 30. See Bradley, supra note 21, at 691–94; Clopton, supra note 21, at 35–43; Posner & 
Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1204–07. 
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Second, with respect to administrative law, this Article contributes 
to the literature concerning the place of interpretive canons under 
Chevron and Skidmore. The majority view is that all canons of 
interpretation should be applied at Chevron step one.31 But some 
scholars have argued that normative canons should be applied at 
Chevron step two.32 This Article suggests that normative canons fall into 
three categories: (1)	those that operate as non-delegation rules and must 
be applied at Chevron step one; (2)	those that properly apply at Chevron 
step two when a court determines whether an agency’s interpretation of 
a statute is reasonable; and (3)	those whose application is foreclosed by 
an agency’s interpretation of a statute. The presumption against 
extraterritoriality is an important example—though by no means the 
only example—of a step-two normative canon. 
Part I introduces the two frameworks for statutory interpretation 
relevant to this Article—deference to administrative agencies under 
Chevron and Skidmore, and the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
Part II looks at how the Supreme Court has treated other canons of 
interpretation within the Chevron framework. It distinguishes canons 
applied at Chevron step one, canons applied at Chevron step two, and 
canons whose application may be foreclosed by agency interpretations 
of a statute. 
Part III looks at what the Supreme Court has already said about 
deference to agency interpretations of geographic scope, concluding that 
the Court has applied the normal rules of deference to questions of 
geographic scope, that the Court has never applied the presumption 
against extraterritoriality at Chevron step one but has suggested that it 
could be applied at step two, and that the Court has in fact deferred to 
agencies on questions of geographic scope. Part IV argues that 
incorporating the presumption against extraterritoriality at step two of 
the Chevron analysis makes sense because agencies are better than 
 
 31. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Normative Canons in the Review of Administrative 
Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 66 (2008) (noting majority view “that courts should continue 
to interpret legislation independently when normative canons would apply, even when 
Congress has charged a particular agency with the statute’s administration”). 
 32. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 206 (2006) (“[J]udges should defer to agencies’ 
choices about whether, when, and how to employ the traditional tools where a linguistic gap 
or ambiguity exists in the provision immediately at hand.”); Bamberger, supra note 31, at 111 
(“[I]n reviewing otherwise deference-deserving agency constructions, the canon inquiry 
should be incorporated into Chevron’s second-step analysis of the agency construction’s 
reasonableness.”). A recent student note has also attempted to distinguish normative canons 
that should be applied at Chevron step one from those that should be applied at Chevron step 
two. See generally Note, Chevron and the Substantive Canons: A Categorical Distinction, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 594 (2010). 
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courts at understanding statutory purpose, evaluating alternatives, 
assessing foreign relations implications, and calibrating extraterritorial 
regulatory schemes. 
Part V considers in greater detail just how the presumption against 
extraterritoriality may be incorporated at Chevron step two. This Part 
first considers and rejects the argument that the form of delegation 
matters—that is, that either an express delegation of authority to 
regulate extraterritorially or a clear indication of extraterritoriality in 
the statute should be a precondition to deference. Part V next considers 
four possible models for evaluating reasonableness, concluding that 
courts should uphold an agency’s interpretation of a provision’s 
geographic scope if the agency considered the normative values 
reflected in the presumption, even if the agency did not apply the 
presumption itself. Part V then tests these models by providing three 
examples in which agencies have interpreted the geographic scope of 
statutes they administer: HSR, Regulation S, and the Volcker Rule. It 
concludes that each of these interpretations should be held reasonable at 
Chevron step two. 
Finally, Part VI considers two implications from this conclusion. 
Section VI.A concludes that agencies are free to change their 
interpretations of a provision’s geographic scope in response to changing 
circumstances, changing policy views, or both. Section VI.B considers 
whether agencies may depart from the geographic scope that federal 
courts applying the presumption have given a statutory provision. It 
concludes that the answer is clearly yes with respect to the 
interpretations of lower federal courts. With respect to Supreme Court 
decisions, the answer depends on whether the Court decides to extend 
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Services (“Brand X”)33 to its own decisions. In sum, deference to 
administrative agencies will not only produce better interpretations of 
geographic scope in the first instance but will also provide a mechanism 
for such interpretations to change. 
I.  TWO FRAMEWORKS FOR STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Deference to administrative agencies and the presumption against 
extraterritoriality are two different frameworks for statutory 
interpretation. Sometimes only one of these frameworks comes into 
play. Some statutes interpreted by agencies have no extraterritorial 
application, and some statutes with extraterritorial application are not 
 
 33. 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
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interpreted by agencies. But often both frameworks apply.34 Before 
considering their interaction, it may be useful to review each framework 
independently. 
A. Deference to Administrative Agencies 
Although the Supreme Court had long grappled with questions of 
deference to administrative interpretations of statutes, its 1984 decision 
in Chevron articulated a new framework35—one that the Court has 
elaborated and applied ever since.36 At step one of the Chevron analysis, 
the question is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”37 To ascertain Congress’s 
intent at step one, a court employs “traditional tools of statutory 
construction,”38 tools that include some—but not all—of the canons of 
statutory interpretation.39 At Chevron step two, “if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is 
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of 
the statute.”40 
Chevron based its regime of deference on a theory of delegation: “If 
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation.”41 Importantly, Chevron also 
applied a rule of deference to implicit delegations of authority: 
“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular 
question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not 
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable 
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”42 Chevron 
 
 34. For discussion of a few important examples, see infra Section V.C. 
 35. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984). 
 36. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868–71 (2013) (holding that 
courts must defer under Chevron to an agency’s interpretation of its own jurisdiction). 
 37. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.  
 38. Id. at 843 n.9. 
 39. See infra Part II. 
 40. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 41. Id. at 843–44. With respect to express delegations, the Court said “[s]uch legislative 
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844 (citations omitted). 
 42. Id. at 844 (citations omitted). Whether Chevron’s arbitrary and capricious standard 
for express delegations and its reasonableness standard for implicit delegations are one and 
the same is a question this Article need not resolve. Questions of extraterritoriality usually, 
though not always, involve implicit delegations. 
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buttressed its framework with notions of agency expertise43 and 
accountability.44 In recent cases, the Supreme Court has emphasized that 
its regime of deference to administrative agency “is rooted in a 
background presumption of congressional intent.”45 If Congress left an 
agency-administered statute ambiguous, it “understood that the 
ambiguity would be resolved first and foremost, by the agency, and 
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree 
of discretion the ambiguity allows.”46 
There are, of course, questions preliminary to Chevron’s two steps: 
whether Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority to the 
agency in the first place, and whether the agency in fact exercised that 
authority. These questions have been called Chevron step zero.47 To find 
that Congress has delegated interpretive authority, a court need not 
determine that “the particular issue was committed to agency 
discretion.”48 It suffices that Congress has vested an agency “with 
general authority to administer [a statute] through rulemaking and 
adjudication, and the agency interpretation at issue was promulgated in 
the exercise of that authority.”49 But even if the agency has interpretive 
authority, its views will not be given Chevron deference unless the 
agency has actually exercised that authority. In Negusie v. Holder,50 for 
example, the Court found that the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) had not exercised its interpretive authority under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act because the BIA mistakenly thought 
itself bound by an earlier Supreme Court decision.51 
If an agency interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference, 
either because the agency lacks interpretive authority or because it 
failed to exercise that authority, that interpretation may still be entitled 
to a lesser degree of deference under Skidmore based on its “power to 
persuade.”52 In United States v. Mead Corp.,53 the Supreme Court made 
 
 43. Id. at 865 (noting that agencies may have “great expertise” and that “[j]udges are not 
experts”). 
 44. Id. (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive 
is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such 
policy choices	.	.	.	.”). 
 45. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013). 
 46. Id. (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996)). 
 47. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 
873 (2001) (describing the threshold inquiries as “step zero”). 
 48. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1874. 
 49. Id. 
 50. 555 U.S. 511 (2009). 
 51. Id. at 522. The Court remanded to the agency to interpret the statute and apply that 
interpretation to the case. Id. at 524. 
 52. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
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clear that “Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an 
agency’s interpretation may merit some deference, whatever its form, 
given the ‘specialized experience and broader investigations and 
information’ available to the agency, and given the value of uniformity 
in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law 
requires.”54 Deference to agency interpretations thus runs along a 
continuum. As Mead put it, “[t]he fair measure of deference to an 
agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with 
circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s 
care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the 
persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”55 
B. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
The presumption against extraterritoriality provides a separate 
framework for statutory interpretation. Since 1991, the presumption has 
been the Supreme Court’s principal tool for determining the geographic 
scope of federal statutes.56 The modern presumption is based on two 
rationales.57 First, “it serves to avoid the international discord that can 
result when U.S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries.”58 In 
other words, it accounts for foreign interests.59 Second, the presumption 
 
 53. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 54. Id. at 234 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139). 
 55. Id. at 228. 
 56. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100–01 (2016) (RICO); 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664–65 (2013) (federal common law 
cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute); Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 
247, 255 (2010) (Securities Exchange Act); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 
454–56 (2007) (Patent Act); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173–74 (1993) 
(Immigration and Nationality Act); Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203–04 (1993) 
(Federal Tort Claims Act); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) 
(Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act). Before its 1991 decision in Aramco, the Supreme Court 
had briefly invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality in Argentine Republic v. 
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440–41 (1989) (territorial tort exception to the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act), but otherwise had not employed the presumption since 
1949. See Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (Eight Hour Law). 
 57. Originally, the presumption against extraterritoriality was based on the so-called 
Charming Betsy canon—that Congress does not intend to violate international law. See 
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress 
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains.”). See generally Knox, supra note 29, (discussing original rationale). As international 
law limits on jurisdiction weakened, new justifications for the presumption developed. See 
Dodge, supra note 23, at 2092–93. 
 58. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100. 
 59. The first rationale is sometimes expressed more narrowly as avoiding conflicts with 
foreign law. See, e.g., Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (“This presumption ‘serves to protect against 
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in 
international discord.’	” (quoting Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248)). Because international discord 
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“reflects the more prosaic ‘commonsense notion that Congress generally 
legislates with domestic concerns in mind.’	”60 Both these rationales are 
grounded in congressional intent.61 
As with Chevron, the Supreme Court has elaborated on this 
framework over time. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,62 
the Court even articulated—in what is surely a coincidence—two steps 
in the analysis.63 At RJR step one, the Court asks “whether the 
presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted—that is, 
whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies 
extraterritorially.”64 But the presumption is not a “clear statement 
rule.”65 The Supreme Court has looked to “context,”66 “structure,”67 and 
“legislative history”68 to determine whether the presumption has been 
rebutted—in short, to all the tools of statutory interpretation that courts 
normally employ.69 
At RJR step two, if the presumption has not been rebutted, the 
Court asks whether applying the statute would be domestic or 
extraterritorial, and it does this “by looking to the statute’s ‘focus.’	”70 
The Court first developed this “focus” approach in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd,71 a case interpreting the geographic scope of 
Securities Exchange Act §	10(b),72 which prohibits fraud. There, the 
plaintiffs argued that applying §	10(b) would be domestic because the 
alleged fraud occurred in the United States.73 The Court concluded, 
however, “that the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place 
 
may occur even in the absence of a conflict with foreign law, this Article treats the 
presumption as designed to avoid conflicts with foreign interests, not just conflicts with 
foreign law. 
 60. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100 (quoting Smith, 507 U.S. at 204 n.5); see also Aramco, 
499 U.S. at 248 (stating that unless Congress speaks clearly, “we must presume it ‘is primarily 
concerned with domestic conditions’	” (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285)). 
 61. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248 (describing presumption as “a valid approach whereby 
unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained” (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285)). 
 62. 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
 63. See id. at 2101 (describing “two-step framework”); see also William S. Dodge, The 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality in Two Steps, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 45, 45 
(2016). 
 64. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
 65. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010). 
 66. Id. 
 67. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2103. 
 68. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949). 
 69. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993) (looking to “all 
available evidence”). 
 70. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
 71. 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). 
 72. 15 U.S.C. §	78j(b) (2012).  
 73. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.  
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where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of 
securities in the United States.”74 Because the focus of the provision was 
not found in the United States—plaintiffs had purchased their shares 
abroad—the Court held that applying §	10(b) would be extraterritorial.75 
Different statutory provisions focus on different things. Some focus 
on conduct,76 some on injuries,77 some on transactions,78 and some on 
employment.79 If the provision’s focus is found in the United States, then 
its application is considered domestic and permissible.80 If the 
provision’s focus is not found in the United States, then application of 
the provision is considered extraterritorial and impermissible.81 
If, on the other hand, the presumption against extraterritoriality has 
been rebutted at RJR step one, then the statute’s geographic scope 
“turns on the limits Congress has (or has not) imposed on the statute’s 
foreign application, and not on the statute’s ‘focus.’	”82 In RJR, for 
example, the Supreme Court held that at least two of RICO’s 
substantive provisions had rebutted the presumption by incorporating 
predicate acts that clearly apply extraterritorially.83 It then refused to 
impose further limits based on RICO’s alleged focus on the enterprise 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 273.  
 76. See, e.g., Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005) (explaining that the 
Federal Wire Fraud Statute punishes fraudulent schemes in the United States even if the 
object of the scheme is to defraud a foreign government). 
 77. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016) (“Section 
1964(c) requires a civil RICO plaintiff to allege and prove a domestic injury to business or 
property and does not allow recovery for foreign injuries.”); F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. 
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (stating that antitrust laws “reflect a legislative effort 
to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign anticompetitive conduct has caused” (citations 
omitted)). 
 78. See, e.g., Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266 (explaining that the focus of Securities Exchange 
Act §	10(b) is “upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States”). 
 79. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 255 (1991) (stating 
that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, prior to 1991 amendment, had a “purely domestic 
focus”); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 286 (1949) (stating that the federal Eight Hour 
Law reflects “concern with domestic labor conditions”). 
 80. See, e.g., Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 371 (upholding wire fraud convictions because 
defendants executed the scheme inside the United States); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. 
California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (permitting antitrust claims based on the alleged 
conduct’s substantial effects in the United States). 
 81. See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2111 (dismissing civil RICO claims based 
exclusively on foreign injury); Morrison, 561 U.S. at 273 (dismissing securities claims based on 
foreign transactions); Empagran, 542 U.S. at 165, 175 (dismissing antitrust claims based on 
independent foreign injury and remanding for determination of domestic effects); Aramco, 
499 U.S. at 259 (dismissing Title VII discrimination claims arising from employment abroad). 
 82. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
 83. Id. at 2101–03; see also id. at 2103 (limiting holding to 18 U.S.C. §§	1962(b) and (c) 
and declining to decide the geographic scope of 18 U.S.C. §§	1962(a) and (d)). 
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being corrupted.84 Because there was “a clear indication at step one that 
RICO applies extraterritorially,” the Court did “not proceed to the 
‘focus’ step.”85 
To summarize, the presumption against extraterritoriality rests on 
congressional intent—more specifically, on a presumed desire to avoid 
unnecessary conflict with other countries and on an assumption that 
Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions. The analysis 
typically proceeds in two steps. At RJR step one, the court looks to see if 
the presumption has been rebutted by a clear indication of 
extraterritoriality, employing all the usual tools of statutory 
interpretation. If the presumption has been rebutted at step one, then a 
court applies the statute extraterritorially according to its terms, without 
further limitations based on the statute’s focus. If the presumption has 
not been rebutted at step one, then the court examines the provision’s 
“focus” at RJR step two. If the provision’s focus is found in the United 
States, then applying the statute is domestic and permissible; if the 
provision’s focus is not found in the United States, then applying the 
statute is extraterritorial and impermissible. 
II.  CANONS IN THE CHEVRON FRAMEWORK 
There are several ways that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality might fit into the Chevron regime of deference to 
administrative agencies. One option would be for a court to apply the 
presumption at Chevron step one to resolve any ambiguity about a 
statute’s geographic scope, leaving no question for the agency to 
interpret. A second option would be for a court to apply the 
presumption against extraterritoriality at Chevron step two, by deferring 
to the agency’s application of the presumption or its weighing of the 
normative considerations on which the presumption is based.86 A third 
option would be for a court not to apply the presumption at all if the 
agency has determined the geographic scope of the statute. 
This Part looks at how the Supreme Court has treated other canons 
of interpretation within the Chevron framework, showing—contrary to 
the conventional wisdom—that not all canons are applied at Chevron 
step one. The Supreme Court has applied the textual canons and some 
 
 84. Id. at 2103–04 (“[W]e do not need to determine which transnational (or wholly 
foreign) patterns of racketeering [RICO] applies to; it applies to all of them, regardless of 
whether they are connected to a ‘foreign’ or ‘domestic’ enterprise.”). 
 85. Id. at 2103. While the Court expressed a preference for taking the steps in this order, 
it made clear that courts are not “preclude[d]	.	.	.	from starting at step two in appropriate 
cases.” Id. at 2101 n.5. 
 86. Part V considers various ways to structure a step-two reasonableness analysis. 
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normative canons at step one. But the Court has applied other 
normative canons at Chevron step two when evaluating the 
reasonableness of an agency’s interpretation, and the Court has held 
that an agency’s interpretation of a statute may render others 
inapplicable.87 Understanding how the Supreme Court has treated 
canons of interpretation in general prepares the way to consider how the 
Supreme Court has treated the presumption against extraterritoriality in 
particular, which is the subject of Part III. 
A. Canons Applied at Step One 
Describing step one in Chevron itself, the Supreme Court wrote 
that “[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, 
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at 
issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”88 Certainly 
some canons of interpretation fall into this category. 
The clearest examples of step-one canons are the textual canons. In 
Dole v. United Steelworkers of America,89 the Court invoked “[t]he 
traditional canon of construction, noscitur a sociis,	.	.	.	that ‘words 
grouped in a list should be given related meaning’	” to reject an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute at step one.90 In National Credit Union 
Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co.,91 the Court deployed 
two other textual canons at step one: the rule against making statutory 
language “surplusage”;92 and “the established canon of construction that 
similar language contained within the same section of a statute must be 
accorded a consistent meaning.”93 As Professor Elizabeth Garrett 
explained, “[m]any textual (or syntactic) canons are guides to what a 
particular statutory provision would typically mean to an ordinary 
speaker of the language. They reflect shared linguistic conventions and 
understandings, and thus they are helpfully, and uncontroversially, used 
by courts at step one.”94 
 
 87. A few scholars have similarly recognized that normative canons differ in ways that 
might affect their application within the Chevron framework. See Bamberger, supra note 31, 
at 67 (“Normative canons	.	.	.	vary greatly in their formulation and their application.”); Note, 
supra note 32, at 602–15 (distinguishing normative canons that should be applied at Chevron 
step one from those that should not). 
 88. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984). 
 89. 494 U.S. 26 (1990). 
 90. Id. at 36 (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 114–15 (1989)). 
 91. 522 U.S. 479 (1998). 
 92. Id. at 501. 
 93. Id. (citing Wis. Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 225 
(1992)). 
 94. Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in A 
GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 55, 69 (John F. Duffy 
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Courts have also developed a set of normative canons that reflect 
extra-statutory values.95 The Supreme Court has applied some of these 
normative canons at step one of the Chevron analysis. Perhaps the best 
example of a step-one normative canon is the constitutional avoidance 
canon.96 In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & 
Construction Trades Council,97 the Court invoked the constitutional 
avoidance canon to trump Chevron deference, concluding that “we must 
independently inquire whether there is another interpretation, not 
raising these serious constitutional concerns, that may fairly be ascribed 
to” the statutory provision.98 Similarly, in Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers,99 the Court concluded that it would not defer 
to an “administrative interpretation [that] alters the federal-state 
framework by permitting federal encroachment upon a traditional state 
power.”100 And in INS v. St. Cyr,101 the Court held that the canon against 
retroactive application of statutes applies at Chevron step one.102 
Professor Cass Sunstein has defended applying normative canons 
like these at Chevron step one as a “contemporary nondelegation 
 
& Michael Herz eds., 2005). Occasionally, there have been suggestions that textual canons 
should have less force when an agency has interpreted a statute. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine 
World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 102 (2002) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Because of the 
deference given to agencies on matters about which the statutes they administer are silent, 
however, expressio unius ought to have somewhat reduced force in this context.” (citations 
omitted)); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1823, 1868 (2015) (arguing for reduced effect of textual canons “at least with respect to 
the judicial review of longstanding agency statutory interpretations”). 
 95. See Bamberger, supra note 31, at 72; Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone Karl 
Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 563 (1992). 
Others refer to these as “substantive” canons. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 
26, 68 (1994); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017). 
 96. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act of the 
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a 
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is 
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” (citations omitted)); see also 
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (listing 
this canon and other principles of constitutional avoidance). 
 97. 485 U.S. 568 (1988). 
 98. Id. at 577. 
 99. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 100. Id. at 173 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)). 
 101. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 102. Id. at 321 n.45 (“Because a statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive 
application is construed under our precedent to be unambiguously prospective, there is, for 
Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in such a statute for an agency to resolve.” (citation 
omitted)). 
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doctrine.”103 The idea is that, in some cases, “Congress must decide the 
key questions on its own.”104 Because the nondelegation canons require 
a clear statement from Congress at Chevron step one, they foreclose the 
possibility of deference to the administrative agency at Chevron step 
two. Sunstein notes that “[t]hese canons impose important constraints 
on administrative authority, for agencies are not permitted to 
understand ambiguous provisions to give them authority to venture in 
certain directions; a clear congressional statement is necessary.”105 
Originally, Sunstein placed the presumption against 
extraterritoriality among these nondelegation canons.106 But Sunstein 
later reconsidered this classification, arguing that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality (along with a number of other “comity 
doctrines”) “should not be treated as part of the court’s analysis under 
Chevron Step One” and that “courts should defer to the executive’s 
judgment unless it is plainly inconsistent with the statute, unreasonable, 
or constitutionally questionable.”107 Emphasizing the executive branch’s 
expertise in foreign affairs, he wrote that “resolution of statutory 
ambiguities involves judgments of policy, and those judgments are best 
made by the executive.”108 
B. Canons Applied at Step Two 
Other normative canons have not been applied at Chevron step 
one, but rather at step two, when a court determines whether an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute is reasonable. A good example is the 
presumption against preemption of state law.109 The Supreme Court has 
 
 103. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 22, at 316–17. As Sunstein notes, the 
older nondelegation doctrine is generally thought to be dead, since the Supreme Court has 
not struck down an act of Congress on nondelegation grounds since 1935. See id. at 315. 
William Eskridge and Philip Frickey have similarly argued that some of the normative canons 
amount to a form of constitutional lawmaking. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 593, 598 (1992) (“[T]he Court’s new canons amount to a ‘backdoor’ version of 
the constitutional activism that most Justices on the current Court have publicly 
denounced.”). 
 104. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 22, at 317. 
 105. Id. at 330. 
 106. Id. at 332–33 (“[E]xtraterritorial application calls for extremely sensitive judgments 
involving international relations; such judgments must be made via the ordinary lawmaking 
process (in which the President of course participates). The executive may not make this 
decision on its own.”). 
 107. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1179, 1204. Posner and Sunstein further argued 
for Skidmore deference “even if the executive is not exercising delegated authority to make 
rules or conduct adjudications.” Id. at 1205. 
 108. Id. at 1207. 
 109. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
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given Chevron deference to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an 
express preemption provision in a statute;110 to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of a substantive provision in a statute that would have the 
effect of preempting state law;111 and to an agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of the preemptive effect of its own regulations.112 As the 
Court explained in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,113 “the agency is uniquely 
qualified to determine whether a particular form of state law ‘stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress,’ and, therefore, whether it should be pre-
empted.”114 
Even when an agency’s views on preemption are not entitled to 
Chevron deference, the Court has still given them “some weight” under 
Skidmore.115 In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,116 the Court 
deferred to an agency’s view of whether state tort law would interfere 
with a regulatory standard, even though its view was expressed in its 
brief rather than in the standard itself, because “[t]he agency is likely to 
have a thorough understanding of its own regulation and its objectives 
and is ‘uniquely qualified’ to comprehend the likely impact of state 
requirements.”117 In Wyeth v. Levine,118 the Court explained that, under 
Skidmore, “[t]he weight we accord the agency’s explanation of state 
law’s impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, 
 
 110. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996) (“[O]ur interpretation of the 
pre-emption statute is substantially informed by those [FDA] regulations.”); id. at 496 (citing 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to support “giving 
substantial weight to the agency’s view of the statute” (other citation omitted)). 
 111. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1996) (rejecting argument 
that presumption against preemption “trumps Chevron, and requires a court to make its own 
interpretation of [the substantive provision] that will avoid (to the extent possible) pre-
emption of state law”). 
 112. Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714 (1985) (“The 
FDA’s statement is dispositive on the question of implicit intent to pre-empt unless either the 
agency’s position is inconsistent with clearly expressed congressional intent	.	.	.	.” (citing 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984))); see also 
Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2481 (2013) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Where the 
statute contains no clear pre-emption command, courts may infer that the administrative 
agency has a degree of leeway to determine the extent to which governing statutes, rules, 
regulations, or other administrative actions have pre-emptive effect.” (citing Medtronic, 518 
U.S. at 505–06)). 
 113. 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
 114. Id. at 496 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 115. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000). 
 116. 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
 117. Id. at 883–84 (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 496); see also Williamson v. Mazda 
Motor of Am., Inc. 562 U.S. 323, 335–36 (2011) (giving weight to brief expressing agency 
views of regulation’s preemptive effect). 
 118. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
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consistency, and persuasiveness,”119 although the Court concluded that 
the agency’s position in Wyeth did not “merit deference” under the 
Skidmore standard.120 
Professor Kenneth Bamberger has proposed that all the normative 
canons “should be incorporated into Chevron’s second-step analysis of 
the agency construction’s reasonableness.”121 Normative canons reflect 
normative values, and “[t]he decision-making strength of agencies gives 
them important institutional advantages in weighing the values reflected 
by the canons as against the policies reflected in a statute.”122 An agency 
may have better empirical knowledge about how a particular 
interpretation would affect the values reflected in the canon.123 An 
agency may also have “more access than courts to knowledge about 
congressional will.”124 But Bamberger cautions that reasonableness 
review at Chevron’s second step is not a blank check: “[C]ourts should 
determine whether an agency policy sufficiently reflects the background 
norm.”125 If not, courts should “essentially ‘remand’ the issue to the 
agency to exercise (or not) whatever statutory discretion remained.”126 
Bamberger points out that the prospect of meaningful judicial review 
“can alter administrative behavior prospectively,”127 providing 
“incentives for administrative accommodation of the underlying value in 
the first instance.”128 In sum, the strengths of agency decision making 
support the Supreme Court’s practice of applying at least some 
normative canons at Chevron step two.129 
 
 119. Id. at 577 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001); Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 111. Bamberger acknowledges that textual canons 
should be applied at step one. See id. at 76 (“Inquiries into the statute’s text, structure, and 
purpose, as well as traditional textual construction canons, fit well within that step’s positive 
inquiry, and their continued application to regulatory statutes is uncontroversial.”). 
 122. Id. at 84. 
 123. See id. at 97 (“Where essentially empirical balancing governs a canon’s application, at 
least, agency expertise can provide courts with the very type of information a robust analysis 
of regulation’s impact on canonic norms would require.”). 
 124. Id. at 98. 
 125. Id. at 68. 
 126. Id. at 69. 
 127. Id. at 117. 
 128. Id. at 121. 
 129. Even if one does not agree with Bamberger that all normative canons should be 
incorporated at Chevron step two, his arguments have particular traction with respect to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. See infra Part IV. 
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C. Canons Foreclosed by Agency Interpretations 
Other canons of statutory interpretation are applied neither at 
Chevron step one nor at step two. Instead, the agency’s interpretation is 
deemed to resolve the statutory ambiguity, making application of the 
canon unnecessary. The best example of this sort of canon is the rule of 
lenity.130 
The rule of lenity has been described as a “venerable rule” 
vindicating “the fundamental principle that no citizen should be held 
accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, 
or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed.”131 Yet the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that the rule of lenity does 
not apply at Chevron step one to clarify statutes and strip administering 
agencies of their interpretive discretion.132 Occasionally, the Court has 
suggested that the rule of lenity might be considered at step two “in 
determining whether a particular agency interpretation is reasonable.”133 
Most frequently, though, the Court has concluded that an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of a statute makes the statute clear enough to 
preclude applying the rule of lenity.134 In Lopez v. Davis,135 for example, 
the Court agreed with the Bureau of Prisons that Congress had not 
addressed how the bureau was to exercise its discretion under an early 
release statute and that the bureau’s categorical exclusion from early 
release of felons who possessed a firearm was reasonable.136 The Court 
 
 130. Questions of interpretive deference do not generally arise in criminal cases because of 
the well-established rule that the prosecution’s interpretation of a criminal statute is not 
entitled to deference. See United States v. Apel, 134 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2014) (“[W]e have 
never held that the Government’s reading of a criminal statute is entitled to any deference.”). 
But see generally Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 469 (1996) (arguing that courts should give Chevron deference to executive branch 
interpretations of criminal statutes). 
 131. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 132. In Solid Waste Agency, for example, the Court applied the constitutional avoidance 
and federalism canons at step one, but specifically declined to address the rule of lenity in the 
same way. See Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 & n.8 
(2001); see also infra notes 134–40 and accompanying text. 
 133. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 518 (2009). 
 134. In a statement respecting a denial of certiorari, Justice Scalia argued that considering 
lenity after deference to administrative agencies “upend[s] ordinary principles of 
interpretation.” Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014) (statement of Scalia, J., 
respecting the denial of certiorari); see also Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 
736 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“Agencies, no less than courts, must honor the 
rule of lenity.”). But Justice Scalia significantly understated the authority preferring 
administrative interpretations to lenity. See Whitman, 135 U.S. at 353 (discussing only Babbitt 
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995), in support of 
deference). 
 135. 531 U.S. 230 (2001). 
 136. Id. at 239–40. 
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refused to apply the rule of lenity at either step one or step two of 
Chevron to limit the bureau’s discretion. Because “the statute cannot be 
read to prohibit the Bureau from exercising its discretion categorically 
or on the basis of preconviction conduct,” the Court wrote, the inmate’s 
“reliance on the rule [of lenity] is unavailing.”137 
In fact, the Supreme Court has treated even Skidmore deference as 
precluding resort to the rule of lenity. Interpreting the anti-retaliation 
provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp.,138 the Court concluded that agency 
interpretations of that provision as covering retaliation against oral as 
well as written complaints were reasonable, longstanding, and 
“consequently add force to our conclusion.”139 Only then did the Court 
turn to lenity, which it rejected on the ground that, “after engaging in 
traditional methods of statutory interpretation,” the statute was not 
“sufficiently ambiguous to warrant application of the rule of lenity.”140 
Some lower courts have allowed agency interpretations to foreclose 
the application of other normative canons. The Ninth Circuit has held 
“that the canon of liberal interpretation in favor of Native Americans 
must give way to the Chevron rule that deference be accorded to an 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute,”141 though other circuits 
have disagreed.142 The Federal Circuit has allowed Chevron to trump the 
 
 137. Id. at 244 n.7 (citing Caron v. United States, 524 U.S. 308, 316 (1998)); see also United 
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 679 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (invoking rule of lenity only with respect to questions of interpretation not covered by 
Chevron deference); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 
704 n.18 (1995) (“We have never suggested that the rule of lenity should provide the standard 
for reviewing facial challenges to administrative regulations whenever the governing statute 
authorizes criminal enforcement.”). For lower court decisions, see Oppedisano v. Holder, 769 
F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2014); Yi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526, 535 (4th Cir. 2005); 
Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2005); Amador-Palomares v. Ashcroft, 382 
F.3d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 2004); Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266, 1272 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 138. 563 U.S. 1 (2011). 
 139. Id. at 14–16 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)) (other citations 
omitted). 
 140. Id. In Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995), the Court also appears to have allowed 
Skidmore deference to preclude application of the rule of lenity. See id. at 61, 65. The Court 
did not specify the level of deference and cited Chevron, but it deferred to an agency 
guideline, which would generally be treated under Skidmore. See id. at 61. As in Kasten, the 
Court held that lenity would come into play only after other tools of interpretation had been 
exhausted. See id. at 64–65 (“The rule of lenity applies only	.	.	.	‘after seizing everything from 
which aid can be derived[]’	.	.	.	.” (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239 (1993))). 
 141. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. United States ex rel. Norton, 343 F.3d 
1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 663 n.5 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 142. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Ramah Navajo Chapter v. 
Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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rule of resolving interpretive doubts in favor of veterans in some cases143 
and has allowed the rule favoring veterans to trump Chevron in at least 
one other.144 
The D.C. Circuit has more broadly questioned whether courts 
should employ the normative canons even when evaluating the 
reasonableness of an agency’s interpretation at Chevron step two. In 
Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Thornburgh,145 the court 
reasoned: 
Chevron implicitly precludes courts picking and choosing among 
various canons of statutory construction to reject reasonable 
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. If a statute is 
ambiguous, a reviewing court cannot reverse an agency decision 
merely because it failed to rely on any one of a number of canons 
of construction that might have shaded the interpretation a few 
degrees in one direction or another.146 
How to balance “two legislative policies in tension,” the court reasoned, 
was “precisely the paradigm situation Chevron addressed.”147 
Professor Adrian Vermeule has argued that courts should allow 
agency interpretations to foreclose application of canons more generally. 
“When the statutory text at hand is ambiguous or vague, judges should 
defer to the interpretations of administrative agencies or executive 
agents rather than attempting to fill in gaps or ambiguities by reference 
to other sources,” he writes, including “many of the canons of 
construction.”148 Like Bamberger, Vermeule argues that “[a]gencies will 
often possess far better information about the legislative process that 
produced the statute, about the specialized policy context surrounding 
the statute’s enactment, and about the resulting legislative deal.”149 But 
unlike Bamberger, Vermeule would not ask at Chevron step two 
 
 143. Nat’l Org. of Veterans Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 809 F.3d 1359, 
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Nielson v. Shinseki, 607 F.3d 802, 808 & n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  
 144. Kirkendall v. Dep’t of Army, 479 F.3d 830, 846 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 145. 868 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir.), aff’d by an equally divided court, 493 U.S. 38 (1989) 
(mem.). 
 146. Id. at 1292; see also Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“If	.	.	.	the 
statute is ambiguous, then Chevron step two ‘implicitly precludes courts picking and choosing 
among various canons of construction to reject reasonable agency interpretations.’	” (quoting 
Mich. Citizens, 868 F.2d at 1292)). 
 147. Mich. Citizens, 868 F.2d at 1293. In another case, the D.C. Circuit held that normative 
canons could not be used at step two even to show that the agency’s interpretation was 
reasonable. See Ober United Travel Agency, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 135 F.3d 822, 825 
(D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 148. VERMEULE, supra note 32, at 183. 
 149. Id. at 209. 
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whether the agency had sufficiently considered the normative canon or 
its underlying values.150 
Reasonable minds may differ about how the strengths of agency 
decision making should affect the application of normative canons 
within the Chevron framework. But it should at least be clear that there 
is a range of possibilities. The Supreme Court has clearly held that some 
normative canons apply at Chevron step one, that others apply at 
Chevron step two, and that still others may not apply at all once an 
agency has interpreted a statute. This Article now considers what the 
Supreme Court has already said about where the presumption against 
extraterritoriality falls within this range of possibilities. 
III.  THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF DEFERENCE 
This Part moves from canons in general to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in particular. Contrary to the assumptions of some 
courts and commentators, the Supreme Court’s decisions do not 
establish that the presumption is a tool of interpretation to be applied at 
Chevron step one. Instead, these decisions suggest that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality should be applied when a court considers the 
reasonableness of an agency interpretation at Chevron step two. 
A. Foley Bros. v. Filardo 
The Supreme Court first considered the relationship between the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and agency interpretations in 
Foley Bros. v. Filardo.151 The interpretive question was whether the 
federal Eight Hour Law mandating overtime pay applied to a contract 
between the United States and a private contractor to perform 
construction work in Iran and Iraq.152 The Court began with the 
presumption against extraterritoriality—“that legislation of Congress, 
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”153 There was nothing in the 
text or legislative history of the act, the Court concluded, to rebut this 
presumption.154 
 
 150. Id. at 206 (“[J]udges should defer to agencies’ choices about whether, when, and how 
to employ the traditional tools where a linguistic gap or ambiguity exists in the provision 
immediately at hand.”). 
 151. 336 U.S. 281 (1949). 
 152. 40 U.S.C. §§	321–26 (1946); Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 282–83. 
 153. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285 (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 
(1932)). 
 154. Id. at 285–88. 
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But the Court went on to consider whether “administrative 
interpretations of the Eight Hour Law” might provide a “touchstone by 
which its geographic scope can be determined.”155 First, there was an 
executive order suspending the law at U.S. military bases leased from 
Great Britain, which indicated “a conclusion on the part of the President 
that the statute applied, or might apply, to these bases.”156 But the order 
did not speak to “the Act’s applicability to localities unquestionably and 
completely beyond the direct legislative competence of the United 
States.”157 There were also two attorney general’s opinions interpreting 
the act.158 But they pointed in different directions, with the 1905 opinion 
indicating that the law did apply to the construction of public works in 
the Panama Canal Zone and the 1924 opinion indicating that the law did 
not apply to English workers remodeling the U.S. Embassy in London.159 
Finally, the Court noted that the Treasury Department did not require 
use of its standard construction contract with an eight-hour provision in 
foreign countries and that the State Department did not consider it 
necessary to include such provisions in contracts to be performed in 
foreign countries.160 In the end, the Court concluded “that administrative 
interpretations of the Act, although not specifically directed at the 
precise problem before us” tended to support a “restricted geographical 
scope.”161 
In Foley Bros., the presumption against extraterritoriality did not 
make administrative interpretations of the Eight Hour Law irrelevant. 
Foley Bros. was decided long before Chevron, but it came just five years 
after Skidmore.162 Although Foley Bros. did not cite Skidmore, the Court 
gave the administrative interpretations of the Eight Hour Law precisely 
the kind of treatment one would have expected under Skidmore, looking 
in each instance to “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
 
 155. Id. at 288. 
 156. Id.; Exec. Order No. 8623, 6 Fed. Reg. 13 (Dec. 31, 1940). The same was true of other 
executive orders suspending operation of the act in other U.S. possessions. Foley Bros., 336 
U.S. at 282–83. 
 157. Id. at 288–89. 
 158. Id. at 289. 
 159. Id.; see Eight Hour Law—Public Works Outside the Territorial Limits of the United 
States, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 257 (1924); Eight Hour Law—Panama Canal, 25 Op. Att’y Gen. 441 
(1905). 
 160. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 290. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Skidmore was decided in 1944, Foley Bros. in 1949, and Chevron in 1984. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984); Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 
281; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 134 (1944). 
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persuade.”163 The fact that the question in Foley Bros. was one of 
geographic scope, rather than some other interpretive question, did not 
change the Court’s approach to administrative interpretations. 
B. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc. 
Chevron was decided in 1984. Four years later, in K Mart Corp. v. 
Cartier, Inc.,164 the Supreme Court applied Chevron’s two-step 
framework to evaluate an agency’s interpretations of a statute’s 
geographic scope. To deal with the problem of gray-market goods,165 
Congress passed Tariff Act §	526, prohibiting the importation of “any 
merchandise of foreign manufacture” that bears a trademark owned by 
a U.S. national.166 The Customs Service issued regulations creating two 
exceptions to the prohibition: (1) a “common-control” exception, 
permitting importation if the foreign and U.S. trademarks were owned 
by the same person or by persons subject to common ownership or 
control;167 and (2) an “authorized-use” exception, permitting 
importation if the trademark was applied under authorization of the 
U.S. owner.168 The Court splintered on the application of Chevron’s two-
step analysis, but a majority agreed that Chevron provided the proper 
framework.169 And although Justice Brennan did not invoke Chevron 
directly,170 he similarly framed his analysis in terms of the ambiguity of 
the statute and the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation.171 
Applying Chevron’s two-step analysis to the common-control 
exception, Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice White) found the phrase 
“foreign manufacture” to be ambiguous because it could refer to goods 
made in a foreign country or to goods made by a foreign company and 
held that the agency was therefore “entitled to choose any reasonable 
definition and to interpret the statute to say that goods manufactured by 
 
 163. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; see Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 288–90. 
 164. 486 U.S. 281 (1988). 
 165. As the Court explained, “[a] gray-market good is a foreign-manufactured good, 
bearing a valid United States trademark, that is imported without the consent of the United 
States trademark holder.” Id. at 285. 
 166. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 526, 46 Stat. 741 (codified as amended at 19 
U.S.C. § 1526(a) (2012)). 
 167. 19 C.F.R. §	133.21(c)(1)–(2) (1987). 
 168. Id. §	133.21(c)(3). 
 169. Justice Kennedy set forth the Chevron framework in section II.A of his opinion, K 
Mart, 486 U.S. at 291–92, which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Blackmun, and 
Justice O’Connor joined, see id. at 318 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 170. Instead, Justice Brennan relied upon INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), a 
subsequent case applying Chevron. See K Mart, 486 U.S. at 300, 309 (Brennan, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (citing Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 445–49). 
 171. See infra notes 173–74, 178 and accompanying text. 
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a foreign subsidiary or division of a domestic company are not goods ‘of 
foreign manufacture.’	”172 Justice Brennan (joined by Justices Marshall 
and Stevens) agreed that “foreign manufacture” was ambiguous173 and 
concluded that the Customs Service’s interpretation was “reasonable.”174 
Justice Scalia (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun 
and O’Connor), on the other hand, thought “of foreign manufacture” 
could mean only “manufactured abroad” and so would have invalidated 
the agency’s regulation at Chevron step one.175 The agency’s authorized-
use exception, on the other hand, did not survive Chevron step one.176 A 
majority of the Court concluded that “[u]nder no reasonable 
construction of the statutory language can goods made in a foreign 
country by an independent foreign manufacturer be removed from the 
purview of the statute.”177 Justice Brennan disagreed, but again in ways 
that echoed Chevron.178 
Thus, just four years after Chevron, the Supreme Court applied its 
two-step analysis in the context of extraterritorial regulation. Moreover, 
the Court specifically deferred to an agency on the geographic scope of a 
statute, upholding its interpretation of the phrase “of foreign 
manufacture” to exclude goods manufactured by a foreign affiliate of a 
U.S. company.179 K Mart does not definitively settle the relationship 
between Chevron and the presumption against extraterritoriality for two 
reasons—first, because it predates the revival of the presumption in 
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.180 and EEOC v. 
Arabian American Oil Co (“Aramco”);181 and, second, because the 
phrase “of foreign manufacture” might have rebutted the presumption 
even if the Court had thought the presumption applicable. But K Mart 
does provide another example of the Supreme Court applying its 
standard rules of deference to administrative agencies to questions of 
geographic scope. 
 
 172. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 292–93 (Kennedy, J.). 
 173. See id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 174. Id. at 309. 
 175. Id. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 176. Id. at 294 (majority opinion). 
 177. Id.; see also id. at 323 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Section 
526(a) also unambiguously embraces	.	.	.	the situation	.	.	.	in which a domestic trademark 
owner and registrant authorizes a foreign firm to use its United States trademark abroad.”). 
 178. Id. at 316 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Since I believe 
that the application of §	526 to [authorized use] is ambiguous, the sole remaining question is 
whether Treasury’s decision to exclude [authorized use] from §	526’s prohibition is entitled to 
deference.”). 
 179. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
 180. 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
 181. 499 U.S. 244 (1991); see supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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C. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. 
The presumption against extraterritoriality was reborn in 
Aramco.182 There, the Supreme Court relied on the presumption to 
conclude that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,183 which prohibits 
employment discrimination, did not apply to a U.S. company’s 
employment of a U.S. citizen abroad.184 
For present purposes, the important part of the Aramco Court’s 
analysis is its treatment of the EEOC’s 1988 guideline construing Title 
VII to apply extraterritorially.185 The Court concluded at Chevron step 
zero that this guideline was not entitled to Chevron deference because 
Congress had not given the EEOC authority to promulgate rules and 
regulations for Title VII.186 The Court therefore evaluated the guideline 
under Skidmore, finding that its “persuasive value is limited”187 because 
the agency changed its position since Title VII’s enactment but 
“offer[ed] no basis in its experience for the change.”188 Given the limited 
persuasive value of the guideline under Skidmore, the Court concluded, 
“the EEOC’s interpretation is insufficiently weighty to overcome the 
presumption against extraterritorial application.”189 
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion specifically on the issue of 
deference. He questioned the Court’s conclusion that the EEOC’s views 
were “not entitled to the deference normally accorded administrative 
agencies under Chevron.”190 Instead, Justice Scalia would have rejected 
the EEOC’s interpretation as unreasonable at Chevron step two: 
[D]eference is not abdication, and it requires us to accept only 
those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the 
principles of construction courts normally employ. Given the 
presumption against extraterritoriality that the Court accurately 
describes, and the requirement that the intent to overcome it be 
“clearly expressed,” it is in my view not reasonable to give effect 
to mere implications from the statutory language as the EEOC 
 
 182. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 183. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701–716, 78 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§	2000e–2000e-17). 
 184. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 259. 
 185. See id. at 257–58. 
 186. See id. at 257. 
 187. Id. at 258 (footnote omitted). 
 188. Id. at 257; cf. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (noting that a 
“[s]udden and unexplained change	.	.	.	may be ‘arbitrary [and] capricious’	” (quoting 5 U.S.C. 
§	706(2)(A)) (citations omitted)). 
 189. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 258. 
 190. Id. at 259 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Justice Scalia 
characterized the question as “unsettled.” Id. at 260. 
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has done. Cf. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 
Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2114 (1990).191 
It is notable that both the Court and Justice Scalia viewed questions 
of geographic scope as subject to the normal rules of deference to 
administrative agencies under Skidmore and Chevron. The Court 
concluded at step zero that the EEOC’s interpretation was not entitled 
to Chevron deference because the EEOC had not been delegated 
authority to issue interpretations with the force of law.192 The Court also 
found that the EEOC’s interpretation was not persuasive under 
Skidmore.193 But in concluding that this particular interpretation was 
“insufficiently weighty to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritorial application,”194 the Court left open the possibility that 
another agency interpretation—even one entitled only to Skidmore 
deference—might be sufficiently weighty to overcome the presumption. 
Justice Scalia also thought that the normal rules of deference to 
administrative agencies applied to questions of geographic scope. He 
would have rejected the EEOC’s interpretation at Chevron step two on 
the ground that it was not “reasonable in light of the principles of 
construction courts normally employ,” specifically the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.195 However, he left open the possibility of 
deference to an agency interpretation that took the presumption against 
extraterritoriality into account. 
Notably, neither the Court nor Justice Scalia took the position in 
Aramco that the presumption against extraterritoriality should be 
applied at Chevron step one to remove all ambiguity and leave nothing 
for the agency to decide, as Cass Sunstein had done in the 1990 article 
that Justice Scalia cited.196 The fact that Sunstein put the step-one option 
on the table makes the decisions of both the Court and Justice Scalia not 
to endorse that option all the more striking.197 
 
 191. Id. at 260. 
 192. See id. at 257 (majority opinion). 
 193. Id. at 258. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 196. Sunstein later changed his position. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1204; see 
also supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.  
 197. Note that Justice Scalia cited Sunstein using a “cf.” signal, which means that the cited 
authority supports a proposition different from, but analogous to, the text proposition. See 
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 260 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see 
also THE SUPREME COURT’S STYLE GUIDE §	11.2(d) (Jack Metzler ed., 2016). 
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D. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,198 the Supreme Court 
applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to §	10(b) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act.199 The Court rejected the conduct and effects 
tests developed by the lower courts.200 Instead, it adopted a 
“transactional test,”201 holding that §	10(b) reaches fraud “only in 
connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed on an American 
stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the 
United States.”202 
Justice Scalia wrote for the Court in Morrison and, near the end of 
his opinion, he returned to the question of deference to agency 
interpretations that had prompted his concurrence in Aramco. Section 
10(b) expressly gives the SEC authority to prescribe rules.203 SEC Rule 
10b-5 implementing this provision had not interpreted its geographic 
scope,204 but the SEC had adopted the lower courts’ conduct and effects 
tests in adjudications under the Exchange Act.205 As a general matter, 
SEC adjudications are entitled to Chevron deference,206 and the U.S. 
Solicitor General argued that the Court should defer to the SEC’s 
interpretation of §	10(b)’s geographic scope in those adjudications.207 
The Court declined to defer for two reasons. First, at Chevron step 
zero, Justice Scalia noted that “the Commission did not purport to be 
providing its own interpretation of the statute, but relied on decisions of 
federal courts.”208 This treatment of the SEC’s interpretation echoed the 
Court’s decision the previous Term in Negusie v. Holder, which rejected 
a Board of Immigration Appeals interpretation because the BIA had 
 
 198. 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 199. 15 U.S.C. §	78j(b) (2012) (making it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security	.	.	.	or any securities-based swap agreement any 
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance”). 
 200. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 256–61 (reviewing lower court decisions). 
 201. Id. at 269. 
 202. Id. at 273. 
 203. See 15 U.S.C. §	78j(b) (making it unlawful “[t]o use	.	.	. any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors”). 
 204. See 17 C.F.R. §	240.10b-5 (2016). 
 205. See In re U.S. Sec. Clearing Corp., 52 S.E.C. 92, 95 n.14, 96 n.16 (1994); In re Robert 
F. Lynch, Exchange Act Release No. 11,737, 8 SEC Docket 75, 78 n. 15 (Oct. 15, 1975). 
 206. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002). 
 207. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 272. 
 208. Id. (citing In re Robert F. Lynch, Exchange Act Release No. 11,737, 8 SEC Docket 
75, 78 n. 15 (Oct. 15, 1975)). 
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mistakenly thought its hands tied by a prior judicial decision and thus 
“ha[d] not exercised its interpretive authority.”209 
Alternatively, Justice Scalia concluded that the SEC’s 
interpretation was not reasonable at Chevron step two, quoting his own 
concurring opinion in Aramco.210 Because the SEC’s decisions had 
ignored the presumption against extraterritoriality, Justice Scalia 
concluded, “we owe them no deference.”211 As with Aramco, Scalia’s 
treatment of Chevron deference is significant for what it does not do—
apply the presumption against extraterritoriality at Chevron step one to 
determine that the intent of Congress is clear.212 It leaves open the 
possibility that an agency decision exercising the authority delegated by 
Congress to interpret the geographic scope of a statute it administers 
would be entitled to Chevron deference, at least if the agency considered 
(rather than ignored) the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
That possibility is confirmed by Morrison’s discussion in two other 
places. First, in considering whether there was sufficient evidence in the 
Securities Exchange Act to rebut the presumption, Justice Scalia 
discussed with approval §	30(a) of that act, which makes it unlawful for 
brokers and dealers to carry out any transaction “on an exchange not 
within or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” in the 
securities of a U.S. issuer “in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe.”213 Scalia lauded this section for 
“contain[ing] what §	10(b) lacks: a clear statement of extraterritorial 
effect.”214 It is true, of course, that §	 30(a) contains language that would 
rebut the presumption.215 But it is also true that §	30(a) expressly 
 
 209. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 522 (2009). 
 210. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 272 (“We need ‘accept only those agency interpretations that 
are reasonable in light of the principles of construction courts normally employ.’	” (quoting 
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment))). 
 211. Id. at 272–73. 
 212. Justice Scalia has been critical of expanding step one. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421, 453–54 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing the implication 
“that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever, 
‘[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction,’ they are able to reach a conclusion as 
to the proper interpretation of the statute” as “an evisceration of Chevron” (alteration in 
original) (quoting majority opinion)); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (“If Chevron is to have any meaning, then, 
congressional intent must be regarded as ‘ambiguous’ not just when no interpretation is even 
marginally better than any other, but rather when two or more reasonable, though not 
necessarily equally valid, interpretations exist.”). 
 213. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 264 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §	78dd(a) (2012)). 
 214. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265. 
 215. See 15 U.S.C. §	78dd(a) (2012) (referring to exchanges “not within or subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States”). 
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delegates to the SEC the authority to regulate extraterritoriality.216 If an 
express delegation of such authority is permissible, then an implicit 
delegation should be as well, for it is one of the teachings of Chevron 
that Congress may delegate regulatory authority implicitly as well as 
expressly.217 
Second, and perhaps more significantly, in discussing the focus of 
§	10(b), Justice Scalia did rely on a different SEC interpretation of 
geographic scope. This interpretation, known as Regulation S, construes 
the registration requirements of the 1933 Securities Act “not to 
include	.	.	.	sales that occur outside the United States.”218 Scalia used this 
regulation to show that “[t]he same focus on domestic transactions is 
evident in the Securities Act” as in the Exchange Act.219 Of course, 
Regulation S would only be relevant to show the focus of the Securities 
Act if it were entitled to deference as the reasonable interpretation of an 
agency charged with the administration of the act. 
In short, not only did Morrison avoid holding that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applies at Chevron step one to remove 
ambiguities from the statute, it endorsed the notion that Congress may 
delegate to administrative agencies the authority to regulate 
extraterritorially, and it actually deferred to an agency regulation 
defining the geographic scope of a statutory provision. 
*     *     * 
What may one conclude from what the Supreme Court has already 
said about deference to agency interpretations of geographic scope? 
First, and most broadly, questions of geographic scope are treated no 
differently from other questions of interpretation. The Court applied the 
normal rules of Chevron deference in K Mart, Aramco, and Morrison, 
concluding that deference was due in the first case and not in the other 
two.220 The Court also applied the normal rules of Skidmore deference in 
Foley Bros. and Aramco, suggesting in each case that even Skidmore 
deference might be sufficient to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.221 
Second, courts are not to apply the presumption against 
extraterritoriality at Chevron step one to remove any ambiguity about 
 
 216. See id. (prohibiting actions “in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe”). 
 217. See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 218. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269 (quoting 17 C.F.R. §	230.901 (2016)). For further discussion 
of Regulation S, see infra Section V.C.2. 
 219. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 268 (citation omitted). 
 220. See supra notes 172–74, 186, 208–11 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra notes 155–63, 187–89 and accompanying text. 
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geographic scope and leave no discretion to the agency. The Supreme 
Court has certainly concluded that an agency’s interpretation was not 
entitled to Chevron deference at step zero—in Aramco because the 
agency lacked the authority to make binding interpretations222 and in 
Morrison because it had not exercised that authority.223 The Supreme 
Court has also suggested in Morrison that an agency’s interpretation 
might not be reasonable if it did not take the presumption against 
extraterritoriality into account. But the Court has never applied the 
presumption against extraterritoriality at Chevron step one, despite 
having opportunities to do so in both Aramco and Morrison. 
Third, the Supreme Court does sometimes defer to agency 
interpretations of a statutory provision’s geographic scope. It did so in K 
Mart, before the revival of the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
holding that the agency’s interpretation of the phrase “of foreign 
manufacture” was reasonable.224 And it did so again in Morrison when it 
leaned on the SEC’s Regulation S to show that the focus of the 
Securities Act was on domestic transactions.225 Part IV considers 
whether deferring to agency determinations of geographic scope is 
warranted. 
IV.  THE CASE FOR STEP TWO 
As Part III has shown, the Supreme Court has not treated the 
presumption against extraterritoriality as a normative canon to be 
applied at Chevron step one. If Congress has delegated interpretive 
authority to an agency and if the agency has exercised that authority, the 
Supreme Court has suggested that the presumption should be applied at 
Chevron step two, with courts deferring to reasonable agency 
interpretations of geographic scope and overturning unreasonable 
ones.226 If Congress has not delegated interpretive authority or if the 
agency has not exercised that authority, the Supreme Court has further 
suggested that agency interpretations of geographic scope are entitled to 
Skidmore deference based on their power to persuade.227 
 
 222. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra notes 218–19 and accompanying text. 
 226. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 272 (2010) (“We need ‘accept only 
those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of the principles of construction 
courts normally employ.’	” (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 
260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment))). 
 227. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991) (majority 
opinion); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 288–90 (1990). 
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This Part asks whether such treatment makes sense. Section IV.A 
first considers the strengths of agency interpretation in comparison to 
courts. Agencies are likely to have a better understanding than courts of 
statutory purposes, regulatory options, and potential conflicts with 
foreign interests. Agencies can also calibrate extraterritorial regulation 
far better than courts, maximizing the achievement of statutory purposes 
while minimizing conflicts with foreign interests. Then, Section IV.B 
considers the proper role of courts. It distinguishes the presumption 
against extraterritoriality from the normative canons that are applied at 
Chevron step one, but it also rejects complete deference. Section IV.B 
concludes that having courts review agency interpretations of 
geographic scope for reasonableness at Chevron step two is the best way 
to ensure that agencies actually bring their interpretive strengths to bear 
when they regulate extraterritorially. 
A. The Strengths of Agency Interpretation 
At bottom, the presumption against extraterritoriality serves to 
balance statutory purposes against potential conflicts with foreign 
interests.228 Agencies possess advantages in weighing both. In 
understanding the purposes of statutory provisions, agencies have access 
to information that goes beyond the text and legislative history to which 
courts generally are limited. Agencies also have a better understanding 
of the full range of regulatory options available to achieve those 
statutory purposes. In evaluating potential conflicts with foreign 
interests, agencies may take advantage of their contacts with foreign 
regulators, while courts consider the possibilities of conflict only in the 
abstract. Not only are agencies better at evaluating both sides of the 
equation, they also have the capacity to strike a more finely calibrated 
balance between them. This Section describes agency advantages with 
respect to statutory purposes, regulatory options, potential conflicts with 
foreign interests, and calibration in turn.  
Statutory purposes are central to both steps of the framework that 
the Supreme Court has developed for courts to apply the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. Courts must look for a clear indication of 
congressional intent to regulate extraterritorially at RJR step one and 
must determine the focus of congressional concern at RJR step two.229 
But as Professor Kevin Stack has noted, “[a]gencies are far better 
 
 228. See supra Section I.B. 
 229. See supra notes 62–81 and accompanying text. 
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positioned than courts to discern statutory purposes.”230 The evidence to 
which courts look for a clear indication of extraterritoriality at step 
one—text, context, structure, legislative history—is equally available to 
agencies. Agencies also seem capable of performing step two’s focus 
analysis at least as well as courts.231 Certainly, Morrison expressed 
confidence that agencies could perform this sort of focus analysis when it 
relied on the SEC’s Regulation S as evidence that the focus of the 
Securities Act, like the Exchange Act, was on domestic transactions.232 
In construing the geographic scope of a statutory provision, 
however, agencies have access to additional information about statutory 
purposes that courts lack, including “information about the legislative 
process that produced the statute, about the specialized policy context 
surrounding the statute’s enactment, and about the resulting legislative 
deal.”233 As Professor Peter Strauss has noted, this makes agencies 
better readers of legislative history, able to distinguish “the legislative 
history wheat, from the more manipulative chaff.”234 Furthermore, 
agencies continue to receive information about Congress’s preferences 
after a statute is passed “through both formal means such as agency 
budgets, oversight hearings, and official confirmation decisions, and 
through informal means, such as frequent contact with legislators and 
staff.”235 In Chevron, the Supreme Court noted that it had consistently 
 
 230. Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret 
Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 906 (2015). 
 231. See id. at 907 (“To the extent statutory purpose is discernible from statutory text 
(including enacted statements of purpose), agencies and courts have equal access to it, and 
agencies have the advantage of having more than sporadic encounters with the statutes they 
administer.”). 
 232. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 268–69 (2010); see also supra notes 
218–19 and accompanying text.  
 233. VERMEULE, supra note 32, at 209. This is particularly true when an agency has 
participated extensively in the drafting process. See Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of 
Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 79, 129 (2015) (“If the executive is involved in drafting 
legislation, then it will have special insight into what the goals and intentions behind the 
legislation actually were, what the political and practical compromises were, and how 
[members of Congress] thought about specific problems throughout the legislative process.”). 
 234. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to 
Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
321, 347 (1990); see also Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 
STAN. L. REV. 999, 1043 (2015) (reporting that agencies distinguish among different kinds of 
legislative history when interpreting statutes). 
 235. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 98 (footnotes omitted); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory 
Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 512 (2005) (“Agencies are subjected to legislative 
oversight of their implementing activity. They consult with Congress continuously about 
proposals relevant to their jurisdictions. They appear before congressional appropriations 
committees who often have strong views about the directions that agency implementation 
should take.”). 
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deferred to administrative interpretations “whenever decision as to the 
meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling conflicting 
policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in 
the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge 
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.”236 That 
description clearly fits many instances of extraterritorial regulation. 
Agencies also have better knowledge of the range of regulatory 
possibilities and how each of those possibilities might serve the statutory 
policy.237 It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has given Chevron 
deference to agency interpretations of geographic scope in a domestic 
context.238 Agencies can also use notice-and-comment rulemaking to 
obtain “input from a wide variety of sources in a way that can facilitate 
transparent policymaking and reasoned deliberation about the 
consequences of proposed policies.”239 As Professor Kenneth 
Bamberger has summarized, “agencies are more likely than courts to 
possess the resources needed to engage in interest balancing and to 
assess the practical impact of normative policy choices.”240 
Agencies that regulate internationally are generally in contact with 
their counterparts in other countries.241 As a result, these agencies are 
likely to have far better information than courts about the extent to 
which each regulatory option might conflict with the interests of other 
countries and the amount of discord such conflict would cause. Courts, 
by contrast, consider the possibility of conflict with foreign interests only 
in the abstract. Although preventing “unintended clashes between our 
laws and those of other nations which could result in international 
 
 236. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (quoting 
United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)). 
 237. See Stack, supra note 230, at 908 (“Agencies are also better equipped than courts at 
selecting the best means of implementation.”). 
 238. See United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 134 (1985) (“In 
view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the Act itself and the 
inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters, the Corps’ ecological 
judgment about the relationship between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an 
adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under 
the Act.”). 
 239. Stack, supra note 230, at 909. 
 240. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 67. 
 241. See Administrative Conference of the United States: Adoption of Recommendations, 
77 Fed. Reg. 2257, 2260 (Jan. 17, 2016) (highlighting international “coordination in regulatory 
promulgation, mutual recognition of inspection and certification regimes, and coordination 
and information sharing in enforcement” by agencies). In 2012, President Obama issued 
Executive Order 13,609 to promote international regulatory cooperation. Exec. Order No. 
13,609, 3 C.F.R. §	13609 (2012); see also David Zaring, Free Trade Through Regulation?, 89 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 863, 881–86 (2016) (discussing examples of regulatory cooperation under 
Executive Order 13,609).  
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discord” is often cited as one of the reasons for the presumption,242 the 
Supreme Court has never required a showing of actual conflict with 
foreign law.243 
Finally, agencies are able to calibrate the geographic scope of their 
regulations in far finer detail than courts. Noting the complexities of 
regulating employment discrimination abroad in Aramco, the Supreme 
Court observed that Congress could “amend Title VII and in doing so 
will be able to calibrate its provisions in a way that we cannot.”244 
Congress did, in fact, amend Title VII to specify its application to U.S. 
companies and to foreign companies controlled by U.S. companies in 
their employment of U.S. citizens abroad and also to create an exception 
for discrimination required by foreign law.245 But the EEOC has in turn 
issued guidance on the interpretation of these provisions that explains 
their application in greater detail.246 The regulations discussed in Section 
V.C—HSR, Regulation S, and the Volcker Rule—provide further 
examples of calibration that no court would have attempted as a matter 
of statutory interpretation. Such fine-tuning allows agencies to maximize 
the achievement of statutory purposes while minimizing conflicts with 
foreign interests.247 As Professor Peter Strauss has written, “agencies 
read their particular statutes with a far richer understanding of context, 
interrelationship, and impact than courts could hope to achieve.”248 
While generally arguing for Chevron deference on questions of 
geographic scope, Professor Curtis Bradley has questioned whether such 
deference is appropriate for agencies that lack foreign affairs expertise 
and for independent agencies not subject to direct presidential control.249 
But there are good reasons to reject such a qualification. First, many 
 
 242. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing 
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Hondoras, 372 U.S. 10, 20–22 (1963)); see 
also RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016) (noting that 
presumption “serves to avoid the international discord that can result when U.S. law is 
applied to conduct in foreign countries” (citations omitted)). 
 243. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly said that the presumption applies “regardless of 
whether there is a risk of conflict between the American statute and a foreign law.” RJR 
Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2100 (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 
(2010)). 
 244. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 259. 
 245. See 42 U.S.C. §§	2000e(f), 2000e-1(b)–(c) (2012). 
 246. See Enforcement Guidance on Application of Title VII and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act to Conduct Overseas and to Foreign Employers Discriminating in the United 
States, EEOC (Oct. 20, 1993), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/extratesrritorial-vii-ada.html 
[https://perma.cc/NKF5-DDE9]. 
 247. Detailed regulations on geographic scope have the further advantage of providing 
clear guidance to regulated parties of what is covered by a statutory provision and what is not. 
 248. Strauss, supra note 234, at 352. 
 249. Bradley, supra note 21, at 694–95. 
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agencies other than the State Department (including independent 
agencies) do have foreign affairs expertise with respect to the specific 
questions that fall within their areas of responsibility.250 Second, as 
Professor Jody Freeman and Professor Jim Rossi have shown, many 
tools exist to coordinate rule making among different agencies.251 The 
joint rule making with respect to the Volcker Rule shows that such 
coordination can occur even when independent agencies are involved.252 
Third, to the extent coordination with the United States Department of 
State or another government agency with expertise in foreign affairs is 
necessary to make an agency’s interpretation of geographic scope 
reasonable, courts may take such coordination (or the lack thereof) into 
account at Chevron step two.253 In short, the arguments for Chevron 
deference on questions of geographic scope are not limited to agencies 
with foreign affairs expertise or to those subject to the direct control of 
the President. 
B. The Proper Role of Courts 
If there is much to be gained by allowing agencies to interpret the 
geographic scope of the statutes they administer, is there anything to be 
lost by limiting the role of courts? Are agencies capable of protecting 
the normative values reflected in the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as effectively as courts? After all, the Supreme Court 
has held that a number of normative canons should be applied at 
Chevron step one.254 
It may be instructive to compare the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to some step-one normative canons, like the 
constitutional avoidance canon, the canon against encroaching on 
traditional state powers, and the canon against retroactivity. Each of 
these step-one canons reflects normative values that are constitutionally 
based. The underlying assumption appears to be that courts are better 
than agencies at protecting such values. The presumption against 
extraterritoriality, by contrast, is “not founded on constitutional or other 
 
 250. Administrative Conference of the United States: Adoption of Recommendations, 77 
Fed. Reg. 2257, 2260 (Jan. 17, 2016) (“Many agencies successfully engage in international 
cooperation through a variety of different methods.”). 
 251. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1155–81 (2012).  
 252. See infra Section V.C.3 (discussing Volcker Rule). 
 253. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (declining to defer to an agency’s 
foreign policy rationale because it had not consulted with the State Department, to which 
Congress has specifically delegated the formulation of policy). 
 254. See supra Section II.A. 
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concerns that suggest a need for congressional as opposed to Executive 
resolution.”255 
Among the other normative canons, the closest analogue to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality appears to be the presumption 
against preemption.256 It too requires weighing a federal statutory 
purpose against the possibility of conflict with the laws of other 
sovereigns. Although the case law is somewhat muddled, the Supreme 
Court has generally treated the presumption against preemption at 
Chevron step two.257 But the case for applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality at step two is significantly stronger than the case for 
applying the presumption against preemption there. Some have argued 
that courts are better equipped to protect state sovereignty within a 
federal system than administrative agencies.258 But there is little reason 
to think that the same is true with respect to the interests of other 
countries. As others have noted, “the executive branch has much greater 
expertise and access to information than the courts concerning foreign 
affairs matters.”259 Many federal agencies are in close touch with their 
foreign counterparts,260 and one in particular—the Department of 
State—has a strong interest in avoiding unnecessary conflicts with 
foreign interests. 
To suggest that administrative agencies are capable of protecting 
the interests of other countries is not to say that their interpretations of 
geographic scope will necessarily be more constrained than those of 
courts applying the presumption against extraterritoriality. When 
achieving statutory purposes requires extraterritorial regulation and 
when conflicts with foreign interests are weak, one may expect agencies 
to interpret the geographic scope of statutory provisions broadly. What 
one can expect is that agencies will seek to avoid unnecessary conflicts 
 
 255. Bradley, supra note 21, at 694; see also Clopton, supra note 21, at 43 (“The 
presumption against extraterritoriality has a different origin—it is not a constitutionally 
inspired rule, but instead it is a rule designed to promote policy goals and to approximate 
legislative intent.”). 
 256. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.  
 257. See supra Section II.B. 
 258. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 742 (2004) 
(“An agency may expertly assess the extent to which a particular state statute interferes with 
the achievement of a federal goal. Other institutions, however, may better assess issues such 
as the overall distribution of governmental authority and the intrinsic value of preserving core 
state regulatory authority.”). 
 259. Bradley, supra note 21, at 664; see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 1207 
(noting that “the expertise rationale for deference to the executive is stronger in the foreign 
relations setting than in the traditional Chevron setting”). 
 260. See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
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and that they will have a better understanding than courts of when 
conflict is necessary and when it is not.  
If agencies can protect the normative values reflected in the 
presumption against extraterritoriality, would it make sense to defer 
completely to their interpretations of geographic scope, foreclosing any 
application of the presumption? This is what the Supreme Court has 
done with the rule of lenity,261 and it is what Professor Adrian Vermeule 
has suggested for canons of interpretation more generally.262 This Article 
rejects complete deference to agency interpretations of geographic scope 
for two reasons. First, reviewing the reasonableness of an agency’s 
extraterritorial regulation at Chevron step two can ensure that the 
agency has not completely ignored the normative values reflected in the 
presumption.263 It provides a backstop to protect against the rare 
instance in which an agency has interpreted the geographic scope of a 
statute with no regard for foreign interests. Second, the prospect of 
reasonableness review “can alter administrative behavior 
prospectively,”264 giving agencies greater incentives to take comity 
values seriously in the first place. Recent empirical work suggests that 
judicial review does influence the rule-drafting process and that agencies 
take greater account of canons that courts in fact apply.265 In summary, 
as Professor Kenneth Bamberger has written, “the reasonableness 
analysis provides both incentives for administrative accommodation of 
the underlying value in the first instance and the opportunity for 
meaningful judicial review.”266 
Of course, judicial review might take a number of different forms. 
Judicial review should provide appropriate incentives to agencies and 
guard against rogue interpretations. It should also take advantage of 
agency strengths and avoid substituting the court’s judgment for the 
agency’s. Part V focuses on the form that reasonableness review should 
take at Chevron step two. 
 
 261. See supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text. 
 262. See VERMEULE, supra note 32, at 183. 
 263. Cf. Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 493–94 
(2014) (“As a check on executive power, hard look review prevents arbitrary and capricious 
actions, actions unsupported by logical reasoning or evidence, and actions that violate 
procedures or fail to consider relevant alternatives.”). 
 264. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 118. 
 265. See Walker, supra note 234, at 1052 (“The overwhelming majority of rule drafters 
surveyed recognized that judicial review plays a role in their interpretive efforts and that 
judicial views on the various interpretive tools influence their rule-drafting process. For 
instance, nearly four in five rule drafters indicated that it matters to their rule-drafting 
practices whether courts routinely rely on the canons.”). 
 266. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 121. 
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V.  THE PRESUMPTION AT STEP TWO 
If the presumption against extraterritoriality is best applied at 
Chevron step two, the question then becomes just how review at step 
two should operate. Must an agency track what a court would do under 
the presumption for its interpretation to be considered reasonable? Or 
should it be sufficient for an agency to consider the normative values 
that underlie the presumption? 
As a preliminary matter, Section V.A considers and rejects the 
argument that the step-two analysis should vary depending on what the 
statute says about its geographic scope. Chevron itself rejected the 
distinction between explicit and implicit delegations of interpretive 
authority.267 On the one hand, this means that Congress should not have 
to say expressly that an agency may regulate extraterritorially. On the 
other hand, it means that agency interpretations of geographic scope 
should still be evaluated for reasonableness, even if the statute rebuts 
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
Section V.B outlines four possible models for applying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality at Chevron step two. Under the 
first model, a court would find the agency’s interpretation reasonable 
only if the agency applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in 
essentially the same way that a court would. Under the second model, a 
court would defer to the agency with respect to certain inputs into the 
extraterritoriality analysis, such as the focus of a statutory provision, but 
not on the ultimate question of geographic scope. Under the third 
model, a court would find the agency’s interpretation reasonable if the 
agency applied the presumption against extraterritoriality, even if its 
application differs from what the court would have done. Under the 
fourth model, a court would find the agency’s interpretation reasonable 
if it considered the normative values reflected in the presumption, even 
if the agency did not apply the presumption itself. 
Finally, Section V.C considers three significant administrative 
interpretations of geographic scope: (1)	the Federal Trade Commission’s 
(“FTC’s”) interpretation of HSR in its “foreign commerce” exemptions; 
(2)	the SEC’s interpretation of the Securities Act’s registration 
requirements in Regulation S; and (3)	the joint agency interpretation of 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s “Volcker Rule” in the recent regulations 
 
 267. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather 
than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory 
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” (citations 
omitted)). 
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implementing that rule. This Section argues that each is reasonable and 
should be given deference at Chevron step two, even though each likely 
differs from the geographic scope that a court would have given these 
statutory provisions. 
A. The Form of Delegation Should Not Matter 
Before considering how a court might evaluate the reasonableness 
of an agency’s interpretation of a statute’s geographic scope, it is worth 
considering whether the form of Congress’s delegation to the agency 
should make a difference. At least three cases are worth considering: 
(1)	Congress might expressly delegate authority to an agency to 
determine the geographic scope of a statute or to regulate 
extraterritorially; (2)	Congress might clearly indicate that a statute 
applies extraterritorially while saying nothing expressly about the 
agency’s authority to define the statute’s geographic scope; and 
(3)	Congress might say nothing expressly about either the statute’s 
geographic scope or the agency’s authority to interpret that scope. 
As an example of the first case, consider §	30(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act, which makes it unlawful for brokers and dealers to 
effectuate “on an exchange not within or subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States” transactions in the securities of U.S. issuers “in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors or to prevent the evasion of this chapter.”268 One 
might consider this to be the strongest case for deference on two 
grounds. First, the express delegation shows that Congress wanted the 
agency to have extraterritorial regulatory authority. Professor Cass 
Sunstein has argued that nondelegation canons should prohibit only 
implicit delegations and “should not be taken to forbid Congress from 
delegating expressly if it chooses.”269 Thus, even if one considered the 
presumption to be a nondelegation canon, as Sunstein did when he 
wrote his article,270 it should not prevent Congress from adopting a 
provision like §	30(a). Second, the delegation of extraterritorial 
regulatory authority might itself be sufficient to rebut the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. That is what Justice Scalia concluded in 
Morrison when he wrote that “Subsection 30(a) contains what §	10(b) 
lacks: a clear statement of extraterritorial effect.”271 Once the 
 
 268. 15 U.S.C. §	78dd(a) (2012). 
 269. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 22, at 336. 
 270. On Sunstein’s changed thinking with respect to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, see supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
 271. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010). 
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presumption has been rebutted, one might argue that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality simply falls away.272 
The second case is a provision that rebuts the presumption against 
extraterritoriality but does not expressly give the agency authority to 
define the provision’s geographic scope. An example is the Volcker 
Rule, discussed below,273 which prohibits banks from proprietary 
trading. The Volcker Rule’s exception allowing foreign banks to engage 
in such trading “solely outside of the United States,”274 almost certainly 
gives the “clear indication of extraterritoriality” that the presumption 
requires.275 On the other hand, in contrast to §	30(a) of the Exchange 
Act, the Volcker Rule does not contain an express delegation to the 
agencies with respect to geographic scope, only a more general 
delegation to “adopt rules to carry out this section.”276 Under Chevron, 
however, this should make no difference. As the Supreme Court has 
recently made clear, for an agency interpretation to be entitled to 
deference, a court need not find that “the particular issue was committed 
to agency discretion.”277 It suffices that Congress has vested the agency 
“with general authority to administer [a statute] through rulemaking and 
adjudication, and the agency interpretation at issue was promulgated in 
the exercise of that authority.”278 
The third case is a provision that says nothing expressly either 
about its geographic scope or about an agency’s authority to interpret 
that scope. This describes most statutory schemes with potential 
extraterritorial application, from HSR and the registration requirements 
of the Securities Act (both considered below in Section V.C) to §	10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act (which the Court considered in 
Morrison).279 Statutes in this third category should be treated just like 
the other two. One of Chevron’s central teachings is that implicit 
delegations of regulatory authority should not be treated differently 
 
 272. But see infra text following note 284 (arguing that courts should require agencies to 
consider comity even if the presumption does not apply or has been rebutted).  
 273. See infra Section IV.C.3. 
 274. 12 U.S.C. §	1851(d)(1)(H) (2012). 
 275. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265. 
 276. 12 U.S.C. §	1851(b)(2)(A). 
 277. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013). 
 278. Id. Geographic scope is not the sort of major question that Congress cannot be 
presumed to have delegated to agencies implicitly. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000) (holding that the regulation of tobacco was “a decision of 
such economic and political significance” that Congress could not have intended to delegate it 
to the FDA implicitly). Questions of geographic scope are common and vary in their 
economic and political significance. Moreover, as Part IV has argued, agencies are in a better 
position than courts to weigh the significance of extraterritorial regulation. 
 279. See infra Section VI.B. 
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from explicit ones: “Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency 
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a 
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for 
a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”280 
As earlier discussion has shown, even in cases of implicit delegation 
there are good reasons to prefer that agencies define the geographic 
scope of statutory provisions rather than courts.281 
Finally, it is worth adding that the clear indication of 
extraterritoriality—present in the first two cases, but not in the third—
does not make the presumption irrelevant to judging whether an 
agency’s interpretation of the provision’s geographic scope is 
reasonable. In RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court said that if the 
presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted, “[t]he scope of 
an extraterritorial statute	.	.	.	turns on the limits Congress has (or has 
not) imposed on the statute’s foreign application.”282 It goes without 
saying that an agency may not depart from the unambiguous intent of 
Congress.283 But sometimes the limits that Congress has imposed will 
require interpretation—like “solely outside of the United States” in the 
Volcker Rule.284 An agency’s interpretation of such limits must be 
reasonable to be entitled to deference under Chevron, and the values 
reflected in the presumption are relevant to judging the reasonableness 
of the agency’s interpretation. Even if Congress has clearly indicated 
that a provision applies extraterritorially and imposed no express limits, 
it should not be understood to have precluded agencies from doing so 
unless such an intention is unambiguous. The normative values reflected 
in the presumption against extraterritoriality—the need to weigh the 
statutory purpose against international comity—do not evaporate simply 
because Congress indicates that a provision has extraterritorial 
application. The presumption against extraterritoriality is not an on-off 
switch. 
In sum, the form in which Congress delegates interpretive authority 
to an agency should make no difference. The express delegation of 
extraterritorial regulatory authority that distinguishes case one from 
 
 280. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (citations 
omitted). 
 281. See supra Part IV. 
 282. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016). RJR Nabisco 
involved no question of deference to administrative agencies. 
 283. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. This is simply Chevron step one. See supra notes 37–39 
and accompanying text (describing step one). 
 284. 12 U.S.C. §	1851(d)(1)(H) (2012); see infra Section V.C.3. 
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cases two and three makes no difference under City of Arlington.285 And 
the clear indication of extraterritoriality that distinguishes cases one and 
two from case three does not make the presumption against 
extraterritoriality irrelevant.286 No matter what form the delegation 
takes, agencies should be deemed to have the same interpretive 
authority to decide questions of geographic scope as to decide other 
issues. Moreover, regardless of whether the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has been rebutted, the normative values reflected in 
the presumption are relevant in assessing the reasonableness of agency 
interpretations. 
B. Four Models for Evaluating Reasonableness 
How should the presumption against extraterritoriality be 
incorporated into Chevron step two? At the outset, it is worth recalling 
what the Supreme Court said about this question in Morrison: “We need 
‘accept only those agency interpretations that are reasonable in light of 
the principles of construction courts normally employ.’ Since the 
Commission’s interpretations relied on cases we disapprove, which 
ignored or discarded the presumption against extraterritoriality, we owe 
them no deference.”287 This passage might be read strictly to suggest that 
agencies must apply the presumption exactly the way that courts would 
in order to be entitled to deference. But it might also be read more 
generously to foreclose deference only when the presumption had been 
“ignored or discarded,”288 a standard that would not necessarily require 
an agency to apply the presumption in the same way that a court would. 
It is also worth noting that what the Court said here was dictum—it had 
already rejected deference at Chevron step zero because “the 
Commission did not purport to be providing its own interpretation of 
the statute.”289 Thus, this passage from Morrison does not foreclose 
other possibilities. 
Although there is a range of possibilities for incorporating the 
presumption against extraterritoriality into Chevron step two, four 
models seem particularly worth discussing. Under the first model, a 
court would find the agency’s interpretation reasonable only if the 
 
 285. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013); see also supra notes 48–49 and 
accompanying text. 
 286. See supra text following note 284. 
 287. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 272–73 (2010) (quoting EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment)). 
 288. Id. at 272. 
 289. Id.; see supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text. 
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agency applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in essentially 
the same way that a court would. It is possible to read Morrison’s dictum 
this way.290 Indeed, two lower courts have suggested that agency 
interpretations of geographic scope should be entitled to Chevron or 
Skidmore deference only if the agency could point to evidence rebutting 
the presumption in the statute itself.291 The problem with this approach 
is that it turns Chevron step two into a version of Chevron step one. If a 
court is going to insist that an agency interpret a statute exactly the way 
the court would, then the court might as well go ahead and interpret the 
statute itself. “If Chevron is to have any meaning,” Justice Scalia once 
cautioned, “congressional intent must be regarded as ‘ambiguous’ not 
just when no interpretation is even marginally better than any other, but 
rather when two or more reasonable, though not necessarily equally 
valid, interpretations exist.”292 There are good reasons not to apply the 
presumption against extraterritoriality at Chevron step one,293 and those 
same reasons counsel against requiring agencies to apply the 
presumption exactly as courts would in order to be judged reasonable at 
step two. 
A second model would have courts defer to agencies with respect to 
certain inputs into the extraterritoriality analysis, such as the focus of a 
statutory provision, but not on the ultimate question of geographic 
scope. In Wyeth v. Levine,294 a preemption case involving Skidmore 
deference, the Supreme Court said it might give “	‘some weight’ to an 
agency’s views about the impact of tort law on federal objectives,” but 
that it would not defer “to an agency’s conclusion that state law is pre-
empted.”295 A similar approach to the presumption against 
extraterritoriality might allow a court to defer at the second step of its 
framework to an agency’s determination of a provision’s focus296 but 
would reserve the question of whether application of the provision was 
domestic or extraterritorial to the court. This model would be an 
improvement over the first because it would harness agency strengths in 
 
 290. See supra text following note 287. 
 291. See Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is far from 
clear that an agency’s assertion that a statute has extraterritorial effect, unmoored from any 
plausible statutory basis for rebutting the presumption against extraterritoriality, should be 
given [Chevron] deference.”); Keller Found./Case Found. v. Tracy, 696 F.3d 835, 846 (9th Cir. 
2012) (“Because the Director cites no textual evidence of Congress’s clear intention to 
authorize the extraterritorial application of the Act, the Director’s interpretation lacks 
persuasive force [under Skidmore].”). 
 292. Scalia, supra note 212, at 520. 
 293. See supra Section IV.A. 
 294. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 295. Id. at 576 (quoting Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 429 U.S. 861, 833 (2000)). 
 296. See supra notes 70–81 and accompanying text. 
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determining statutory purposes, but this second model still fails to take 
advantage of a significant amount of agency expertise. While it is true 
that agencies would be at least as good as courts at determining a 
provision’s focus for purposes of the presumption,297 their real strength 
lies in evaluating different regulatory possibilities and making the 
tradeoff between statutory purpose and international comity.298 Because 
this approach leaves the ultimate question of extraterritoriality to the 
court, it fails to harness those agency strengths. 
Under a third model, a court would find the agency’s interpretation 
reasonable even if the agency’s application of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality differed from what the court would have done. In 
other words, the court would defer so long as the agency had not 
“ignored or discarded” the presumption.299 As Professor Kenneth 
Bamberger notes approvingly, “agencies might arrive at conclusions that 
would depart from independent judicial canon application.”300 The real 
question is whether courts should require agencies to use the same two-
step framework that courts use for the presumption against 
extraterritoriality,301 even if courts defer to agencies with respect to 
outcomes. In my view, this would be unduly constraining. The 
presumption’s two-step framework was developed for courts, not 
agencies. It simplifies questions of geographic scope for courts that lack 
an agency’s expertise, ability to balance different values, and authority 
to regulate in fine detail. But forcing agencies to act like courts prevents 
them from bringing all of their advantages to bear. 
Under the fourth model, a court would find the agency’s 
interpretation reasonable if it considered the normative values reflected 
in the presumption, even if the agency did not apply the presumption 
itself. As Bamberger puts it, “courts should determine whether an 
agency policy sufficiently reflects the background norm.”302 If so, it 
should uphold the agency’s interpretation as reasonable. If not, the court 
should “essentially ‘remand’ the issue to the agency to exercise (or not) 
 
 297. See supra notes 229–36 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 237–48 and accompanying text. 
 299. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 272 (2010); see also Validus 
Reinsurance, Ltd. v. United States, 786 F.3d 1039, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“To accord 
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presumption against extraterritoriality	.	.	.	.”). 
 300. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 120; see also Mashaw, supra note 235, at 521 (“[I]t seems 
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 301. See supra Section I.B. 
 302. Bamberger, supra note 31, at 68. 
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whatever statutory discretion remain[s].”303 This model allows agencies 
to make full use of their strengths. They can assess the strength of the 
statutory policy reflected in the provision, review the range of regulatory 
options for effectuating that policy, evaluate the conflict with foreign 
interests that each option would create, consider the amount of 
international discord that would be caused by such conflicts, and finally 
adopt a fine-grained regulation to carry out the statutory policy while 
accommodating the interests of other countries to the greatest extent 
possible. 
Of these four models for evaluating whether an agency’s 
interpretation of geographic scope is reasonable, the fourth is clearly 
superior. The first model harnesses none of an agency’s strengths, 
requiring it to interpret a statutory provision just as a court would. The 
second model takes advantage of agency strengths in evaluating certain 
inputs, like the focus of a statutory provision, but by reserving the 
ultimate question of geographic scope to the court, this model ignores 
the agency’s ability to consider regulatory alternatives and make 
tradeoffs between statutory purposes and international comity. The 
third model—deferring to an agency’s application of the presumption’s 
two-step framework even if the result differs from what a court would 
have done—allows an agency to bring all of its interpretive strengths to 
bear. But it forces agencies into an analytical framework that the 
Supreme Court developed with the weaknesses of courts, rather than the 
strengths of agencies, in mind. By freeing agencies from that analytical 
framework and deferring to their interpretations of geographic scope so 
long as they considered the normative values reflected in the 
presumption, the fourth model gives full effect to the interpretive 
strengths that agencies enjoy. As the next Section illustrates, this is what 
agencies have already been doing in defining the geographic scope of 
statutes they administer. 
C. Three Examples 
This Article turns now to consider in detail three examples of 
extraterritorial regulation by administrative agencies, each of which is of 
great practical importance: HSR’s “foreign commerce” exemptions;304 
Regulation S under the Securities Act;305 and new regulations 
implementing the Volcker Rule under the Dodd-Frank Act.306 
 
 303. Id. at 69. 
 304. See 16 C.F.R. §§	802.50–.52 (2016). 
 305. See 17 C.F.R. §§	230.901–.905 (2016). 
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1.  Hart-Scott-Rodino 
The FTC’s regulations implementing HSR307 provide a good 
example of an agency using general rulemaking authority to define the 
geographic scope of a statute. HSR prohibits mergers and acquisitions 
that exceed certain thresholds, unless notification is given to the 
Department of Justice and the FTC and a waiting period has expired.308 
The aim is to give these agencies the chance to review large mergers and 
acquisitions before they occur in order to determine whether they would 
violate the Clayton Act309 or the FTC Act.310 HSR’s text does not define 
its geographic scope, instead speaking broadly of persons “engaged in 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce.”311 As the FTC 
acknowledged when it issued its first regulations under HSR, the Act 
“contains no special provision for transactions having foreign aspects.”312 
HSR expressly gives the FTC, with the concurrence of the Justice 
Department, rulemaking authority to implement the Act.313 This 
authority includes the power to “define the terms used in this section;”314 
to “exempt, from the requirements of this section, classes of persons, 
acquisitions, transfers, or transactions which are not likely to violate the 
antitrust laws;”315 and to “prescribe such other rules as may be necessary 
and appropriate to carry out the purposes of this section.”316 Beyond the 
authority contained in these grants, there is no express delegation to the 
FTC of authority to define the geographic scope of HSR. 
 
 307. 15 U.S.C §	18a (2012). 
 308. Id. 
 309. Id. §	18 (prohibiting acquisitions that might “substantially	.	.	.	lessen competition, 
or	.	.	.	tend to create a monopoly”). 
 310. Id. §	45(a) (prohibiting “[u]nfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce”). If the Department of Justice or FTC concludes 
that an acquisition would violate the Clayton or FTC Acts, it may seek to enjoin the 
acquisition. Id. §	18a(f). 
 311. Id. §	18a(a)(1). “Commerce” is defined in general terms as “trade or commerce 
among the several States and with foreign nations.” Id. §	12(a). 
 312. Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 43 Fed. Reg. 
33,450, 33,461 (July 31, 1978). 
 313. 15 U.S.C. §	18a(d). Such delegations are rare in antitrust law, although one author has 
argued for greater deference to administrative agencies in the antitrust context. See generally 
Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Administrative Antitrust, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191 (2014) (arguing 
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 314. 15 U.S.C. §	18a(d)(2)(A). 
 315. Id. §	18a(d)(2)(B). 
 316. Id. §	18a(d)(2)(C). 
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The FTC issued its first regulations implementing HSR in 1978.317 
From the start it used its rulemaking authority to define the Act’s 
geographic scope.318 It defined “commerce” to have the same meaning as 
in the Clayton and FTC Acts.319 The FTC explained in the Federal 
Register that because HSR’s commerce criterion “requires only that 
either the acquiring or the acquired person be engaged in commerce or 
in any activity affecting commerce,” HSR “permits coverage of a great 
many transactions that have some or even predominant foreign 
aspects.”320 To avoid HSR’s application to foreign transactions “with 
only a minimal impact on United States commerce,”321 the FTC created 
three foreign commerce exemptions: one for the acquisition of foreign 
assets;322 a second for the acquisition of voting securities of a foreign 
issuer;323 and a third for acquisitions by or from foreign government 
entities.324 
Although these regulations are phrased as exemptions, their 
practical effect is actually to subject many acquisitions of assets outside 
the United States and many acquisitions of securities in foreign 
companies to the requirements of HSR. The foreign assets exemption, 
for example, provides that HSR shall not apply to the acquisition of 
“assets located outside the United States	.	.	.	unless the foreign assets the 
acquiring person would hold as a result of the acquisition generated 
sales in or into the U.S. exceeding $50 million (as adjusted) during the 
acquired person’s most recent fiscal year.”325 In other words, the FTC’s 
regulation provides that HSR does apply to assets located in foreign 
countries if those assets generated U.S. sales above a certain threshold. 
This interpretation holds even when both the buyer and the seller are 
foreign.326 The foreign securities exemption similarly provides that HSR 
 
 317. See generally Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 
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does apply to the acquisition of securities in foreign issuers whose U.S. 
assets or U.S. sales exceed certain thresholds whether the buyer is a U.S. 
person327 or a foreign person.328 
It seems doubtful that a court asked to determine the geographic 
scope of HSR without the benefit of the FTC’s guidance would have 
landed in exactly the same place. But it also seems doubtful that a court 
would cast aside the FTC’s guidance and seek to determine the 
geographic scope of HSR for itself, whether by applying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality or otherwise.329 As a general 
matter, FTC regulations implementing HSR are evaluated for 
reasonableness at Chevron step two.330 The D.C. Circuit has noted that 
HSR gives the FTC “great discretion to define statutory terms and to 
promulgate rules to facilitate Government identification of mergers and 
acquisitions likely to violate federal antitrust laws.”331 
In determining the geographic scope of HSR, the FTC did not apply 
the presumption against extraterritoriality.332 But the FTC did consider 
both the “impact on United States commerce” and “considerations of 
 
adjusted); (3) the aggregate assets of both parties in the United States must be less than $110 
million (as adjusted); and (4) after the transaction, the acquiring person must not hold more 
than $200 million (as adjusted) of the voting securities and assets of the acquired person. Id. 
§	802.50(b). 
 327. Id. §	802.51(a). 
 328. Id. §	802.51(b). As with the foreign assets exemption, see supra notes 325–26, there is 
a further exception if both parties are foreign and the transaction meets additional criteria. 16 
C.F.R. §	802.51(c). 
 329. Historically, the Supreme Court has not applied the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to antitrust statutes. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 
798–99 (1993); see also id. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have, however, found the 
presumption to be overcome with respect to our antitrust laws; it is now well established that 
the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially.” (citations omitted)). On the other hand, Morrison 
stated that the presumption applies “in all cases.” Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 
247, 261 (2010). It is possible to reconcile the antitrust cases with Morrison by noting that the 
focus of U.S. antitrust laws is on preventing anticompetitive effects in the United States. See 
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (stating that antitrust 
laws “reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign 
anticompetitive conduct has caused” (citations omitted)). Under RJR Nabisco, if whatever is 
the focus of the provision occurs in the United States, applying the provision is considered 
domestic and permissible. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 
(2016); supra notes 70–81 and accompanying text. 
 330. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. FTC, 790 F.3d 198, 207–09 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(reviewing FTC regulation concerning patent rights). 
 331. Id. at 205. 
 332. In 1978, the presumption had fallen out of use. See Paul B. Stephan, Private Litigation 
as a Foreign Relations Problem, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 40, 40 n.3 (2016) (noting that the 
presumption “seemed to pass into desuetude” between Foley Bros. in 1949 and Aramco in 
1991). Even after the presumption’s revival in 1991, its application to antitrust law remained 
uncertain. See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 798–99 (failing to apply the presumption to the Sherman 
Act).  
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comity” when it decided to exempt “some acquisitions whose principal 
impact is foreign.”333 In other words, the FTC’s regulations 
implementing HSR reflect the same values—domestic conditions and 
comity—that lie behind the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
Under the fourth model for evaluating reasonableness discussed 
above,334 the fact that the agency took into account the normative values 
underlying the presumption should be sufficient to find its regulations 
reasonable at Chevron step two. 
2.  Regulation S 
Another example of an agency using general rulemaking authority 
to define the geographic scope of a statute is Regulation S,335 which the 
SEC first issued in 1990 to exempt certain transactions outside the 
United States from the registration requirements of the 1933 Securities 
Act.336 
Section 5 of the Securities Act makes it unlawful to sell a security 
unless a registration statement is in effect.337 Section 5 does not define its 
geographic scope, requiring only that a person have used “any means or 
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate 
commerce” or “the mails.”338 Section 19 of the Act gives the SEC broad 
authority to “make	.	.	.	such rules and regulations as may be necessary to 
carry out the provisions of this subchapter, including rules and 
regulations governing registration statements and prospectuses for 
various classes of securities and issuers, and defining accounting, 
technical, and trade terms used in this subchapter.”339 But §	19 does not 
expressly give the SEC authority to define the geographic scope of the 
registration requirements.340 
In 1990, the SEC issued Regulation S, interpreting the registration 
requirements not to apply to “offers and sales that occur outside the 
United States.”341 The SEC explained in the Federal Register that 
 
 333. Premerger Notification; Reporting and Waiting Period Requirements, 43 Fed. Reg. 
33,450, 33,497 (July 31, 1978). 
 334. See supra notes 302–03 and accompanying text.  
 335. 17 C.F.R. §§	230.901–.905 (2016). 
 336. 15 U.S.C. §	77e (2012). 
 337. Id. §	77e(a). 
 338. Id. §	77e(a)(1). Section	5 also prohibits the delivery of unregistered securities through 
the mails or any means of transportation in interstate commerce. See id. §	77e(a)(2). 
 339. Id. §	77s(a). 
 340. See id. §	77s. 
 341. 17 C.F.R. §	230.901 (2016). The SEC had previously stated that it would not take 
enforcement action for failure to register securities of U.S. corporations distributed abroad to 
foreign nationals if the distribution would not result in the securities flowing back into the 
United States. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers; Registration of 
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[t]he registration of securities is intended to protect the U.S. 
capital markets and investors purchasing in the U.S. market, 
whether U.S. or foreign nationals. Principles of comity and the 
reasonable expectations of participants in the global markets 
justify reliance on laws applicable in jurisdictions outside the 
United States to define requirements for transactions effected 
offshore.342 
In addition to its general statement, Regulation S creates two safe 
harbors: (1) an issuer safe harbor for issuers, distributors, and their 
affiliates;343 and (2) a resale safe harbor for others who purchase the 
unregistered securities and the resell them.344 Each of these safe harbors 
contains two basic requirements: (1) that the offer or sale be made in an 
“offshore transaction;” and (2) that there be no “directed selling efforts” 
in the United States.345 
An “offshore transaction” is one in which no offer is made to a 
person in the United States and either the buyer is outside the United 
States or the transaction is executed on a foreign exchange.346 Whether a 
buyer is outside the United States typically depends on the buyer’s 
physical location.347 But Regulation S makes clear that offers and sales 
“specifically targeted at identifiable groups of U.S. citizens abroad, such 
as members of the U.S. armed forces serving overseas” do not count as 
offshore transactions,348 while offers and sales to certain non-U.S. 
persons in the United States do count as offshore transactions.349 
As for the second requirement, “[d]irected selling efforts” are any 
activities that may “condition[] the market in the United States for any 
of the securities being offered in reliance on this Regulation S.”350 Some 
 
Underwriters as Broker-Dealers, Securities Act Release No. 33-4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828, 9828 
(July 9, 1964). 
 342. Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, Exchange Release No. 
27,942; Investment Company Act Release No. 17,458, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308 (April 24, 
1990). 
 343. 17 C.F.R. §	230.903 (2016). 
 344. Id. §	230.904. 
 345. Id. §§	230.903–.904. Both safe harbors contain additional conditions for certain 
categories of securities—known as Category 2 and Category 3—in which there may be 
substantial U.S. market interest. Id. §	230.903(b)(2)–(3); id. §	230.904(b)(1). 
 346. Id. §	230.902(h)(1). 
 347. Id. §	230.902(h)(1)(i). 
 348. Id. §	230.902(h)(2). 
 349. Id. §	230.902(h)(3). Specifically permitted are offers and sales to discretionary 
accounts held for the benefit of non-U.S. persons by fiduciaries in the United States, see id. 
§	230.902(k)(2)(i), and offers and sales to international organizations, like the IMF, World 
Bank, and United Nations, and their agencies, affiliates, and pensions plans, see id. 
§	230.902(k)(2)(vi). 
 350. Id. §	230.902(c)(1). 
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are territorial—like placing an advertisement in a publication with a 
general circulation in the United States,351 but others are 
extraterritorial—like making offers to members of the U.S. armed forces 
overseas.352 Furthermore, “to ameliorate the effect of the Regulation on 
a foreign publication’s advertising practices where the United States 
accounts for a limited portion of its circulation,”353 Regulation S 
specifically exempts from the definition of directed selling efforts 
“tombstone” advertisements in publications with less than twenty 
percent of their circulations in the United States.354 
Regulation S further extends the registration requirements of the 
Securities Act extraterritorially by expressly providing that resales “by 
the offshore purchaser” must also be made in compliance with 
Regulation S.355 As mentioned above, Regulation S contains a resale 
safe harbor that contains the same requirements of an offshore 
transactions and no directed selling efforts in the United States.356 
In sum, Regulation S defines the geographic scope of the Securities 
Act’s registration requirements in great detail, and in ways that do not 
always turn on physical location. It considers some sales in the United 
States to be “offshore” and some sales abroad not to be. It exempts 
some advertisements in the United States from the definition of 
“directed selling efforts” but includes other activities outside the United 
States. And it expressly extends the geographic scope of the registration 
requirements to offshore purchasers who resell Regulation S securities. 
It seems unlikely that a U.S. court asked to determine the 
geographic scope of the Securities Act for itself would have arrived at 
the same detailed scheme for its registration requirements, but the 
Second Circuit has held that Regulation S is entitled to deference under 
Chevron as the “reasonable interpretation of a statute that Congress has 
entrusted the agency to administer.”357 Furthermore, in Morrison, 
 
 351. Id. 
 352. Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, Exchange Release No. 
27,942; Investment Company Act Release No. 17,458, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,309 n.35 (April 
24, 1990) (“Such targeted offerings also will be deemed to constitute directed selling efforts in 
the United States.”). 
 353. Id. at 18,311. 
 354. 17 C.F.R. §	230.902(c)(3)(iii). 
 355. Id. §	230.905. 
 356. Id. §	230.904. 
 357. See Europe & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 
F.3d 118, 123 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. 
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 911 (2017) 
2017] CHEVRON & EXTRATERRITORIALITY 965 
Justice Scalia relied on Regulation S to determine the focus of the 
Securities Act and, by extension, the Exchange Act.358 
It is worth noting that the SEC did not apply the presumption 
against extraterritoriality in developing Regulation S,359 but the SEC did 
consider the intent of the statute “to protect the U.S. capital markets 
and investors purchasing in the U.S. market” as well as “[p]rinciples of 
comity and the reasonable expectations of participants in the global 
markets.”360 The consideration of international comity appears to have 
been genuine, for the SEC noted that the primary change it made in 
response to comments was to give “further recognition to the doctrine of 
comity” by reducing the restrictions applicable to foreign issuers relying 
on the safe harbors.361 Under the fourth model for evaluating 
reasonableness discussed above,362 a court should find Regulation S 
reasonable at Chevron step two because the agency took into account 
the normative values underlying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. 
3.  Volcker Rule 
A final example concerns the geographic scope of the so-called 
Volcker Rule contained in the Dodd-Frank Act.363 Much of Dodd-Frank 
applies extraterritorially.364 Among other reasons, this was necessary 
because of the mobility of major financial institutions and because it is 
often necessary to regulate not just financial institutions but their 
counterparties in order to address systemic risk.365 
Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act—colloquially known 
as the Volcker Rule—broadly prohibits banking entities from engaging 
in proprietary trading.366 To avoid regulating the foreign operations of 
 
 358. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 268–69 (2010) (quoting 15 
U.S.C. §	77e(a)(1) (2012)). 
 359. Regulation S was first issued in 1990, a year before the revival of the presumption in 
Aramco. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 360. Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, Exchange Release No. 
27,942; Investment Company Act Release No. 17,458, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308 (April 24, 
1990). 
 361. Id. at 18,307. 
 362. See supra notes 302–03 and accompanying text. 
 363. Pub. L. No. 111-203, §	619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–31 (2010). 
 364. John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come 
Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2014) (“Congress opted for an extraterritorial reach 
for much of the Dodd-Frank Act.”); Michael Greenberger, The Extraterritorial Provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act Protects U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80 UMKC L. REV. 
965, 965 (2012) (noting the “significant extraterritorial scope of the derivatives regulation” in 
Dodd-Frank). 
 365. Coffee, supra note 364, at 1260. 
 366. 12 U.S.C. §	1851 (2012) (codifying Dodd-Frank Act §	619). 
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foreign banks, however, the Volcker Rule included an exception to 
permit banking entities “not directly or indirectly controlled” by U.S. 
banking entities to engage in proprietary trading “provided that the 
trading occurs solely outside of the United States.”367 Congress gave 
federal banking agencies, the SEC, and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission authority to “adopt rules to carry out this section.”368 
In December 2013, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and 
the SEC issued a Joint Final Rule to implement the Volcker Rule.369 
This regulation interprets the geographic scope of the Volcker Rule in 
great detail, providing that it does not apply to foreign banking entities 
(i.e., those not directly or indirectly controlled by U.S. banking entities) 
so long as: (i) the banking entity purchasing or selling (including its 
relevant personnel) is not located in the United States or organized 
under U.S. law; (ii) the banking entity (including its relevant personnel) 
making the decision to purchase or sell is not located in the United 
States or organized under U.S. law; (iii) the purchase or sale is not 
accounted for by a branch or affiliate located in the United States or 
organized under U.S. law; (iv) no financing is provided by a branch or 
affiliate located in the United States or organized under U.S. law; and 
(v) the purchase or sale is not conducted through any U.S. entity (with 
limited exceptions).370 
Congress provided no direct guidance on what it meant by “solely 
outside of the United States.”371 Accordingly, the agencies considered 
the purpose of the Volcker Rule as a whole “to limit risks that 
proprietary trading poses to the U.S. financial system”372 and the 
purpose of the exception “to limit the extraterritorial application of 
section 13 as it applies to foreign banking entities.”373 The agencies 
 
 367. Id. §	1851(d)(1)(H). 
 368. Id. §	1851(b)(2)(A). Congress also provided for the coordination of rulemaking by 
different agencies. See id. §	1851(b)(2)(B). For a discussion of multiple-agency delegation and 
Chevron, see generally William Weaver, Note, Multiple-Agency Delegations & One-Agency 
Chevron, 67 VAND. L. REV. 275 (2014). 
 369. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. 5536, 5536 (Jan. 31, 
2014). 
 370. 12 C.F.R. §	44.6(e)(3) (2016). 
 371. 12 U.S.C. §	1851(d)(1)(h); Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests in, and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. 
Reg. at 5652 (“The statute does not define when a foreign banking entity’s trading occurs 
solely outside of the United States.”). 
 372. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 79 Fed. Reg. at 5654–55. 
 373. Id. at 5655. 
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identified these purposes by examining both the text of the statute and 
its legislative history.374 The agencies also considered the extensive 
comments they received on their proposed rule375 and substantially 
modified their approach in response to those comments.376 No court has 
yet reviewed the agencies’ interpretation of the Volcker Rule’s 
geographic scope under Chevron, but it seems inconceivable that a court 
would upset these regulations by applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality at Chevron step one or by finding the agencies’ 
interpretation unreasonable at Chevron step two. Certainly, under the 
fourth model for evaluating reasonableness discussed above,377 these 
regulations would be entitled to deference. 
*     *     * 
These three examples illustrate a number of important things about 
extraterritorial regulation by agencies. First, such regulation typically 
rests on a general grant of rulemaking authority rather than on a specific 
grant of authority to define the geographic scope of a provision or to 
regulate extraterritorially. Second, such regulation sometimes involves 
provisions that expressly apply extraterritorially (like the Volcker Rule) 
but often involves provisions that do not (like HSR and §	5 of the 
Securities Act). When the presumption has been rebutted, agencies may 
need to interpret the limitations on extraterritorial application that 
Congress has imposed. When the presumption has not been rebutted, 
regulation of foreign conduct may still be permissible if application of 
the provision can still in some sense be considered “domestic.” Third, 
agencies typically do not apply the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in deciding how to regulate activity abroad, but 
agencies do consider the normative values reflected in the presumption. 
More specifically, agencies look carefully at the statutory policy, the 
regulatory options available, and the ways to avoid unnecessary conflict 
with other nations. Fourth, agencies are able to fashion fine-grained 
regulatory schemes to accommodate both statutory purposes and 
international comity in ways that courts could never duplicate. 
If courts were to review these regulatory schemes by applying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality at Chevron step one, it seems 
doubtful that any would survive. With respect to HSR, a court might 
conclude that because the focus of antitrust laws is injury in the United 
 
 374. See id. at 5655 n.1517 (citing 12 U.S.C. §	1851(b)(1)); id. at 5655 n.1518 (citing 156 
CONG. REC. S5897 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Merkley)). 
 375. See id. at 5652–58 (responding to comments on proposed rule). 
 376. See id. at 5654 (“The Agencies have carefully considered these comments and have 
determined to modify the approach in the final rule.”). 
 377. See supra notes 302–03 and accompanying text. 
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States,378 regulation of foreign transactions is permitted. But the 
particular thresholds the FTC has chosen would be hard to justify under 
the presumption alone. With respect to the Securities Act, a court 
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality would almost 
certainly conclude (as Morrison did379) that the focus of §	5 is 
transactions in the United States, effectively precluding regulation of 
resales or directed selling efforts outside the United States. With respect 
to the Volcker Rule, a court would likely conclude that the presumption 
was rebutted, but would be hard pressed to duplicate the agencies’ fine-
grained interpretation of “solely outside of the United States” without 
some measure of deference.380 
The fact that each of these regulations would almost certainly be 
struck down if the presumption against extraterritoriality were applied 
at Chevron step one demonstrates the practical need for courts to 
evaluate the reasonableness of agency interpretations of geographic 
scope at Chevron step two. As this Article has argued, the question 
should not be whether the agency reached the same result a court 
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality would, or even 
whether the agency applied the presumption in reaching a different 
conclusion. The question should be whether the agency’s interpretation 
adequately considered the normative values underlying the 
presumption. HSR’s exemptions, Regulation S, and the regulations 
implementing the Volcker Rule all meet that test and should be upheld 
as reasonable at Chevron step two. 
VI.  CHANGING INTERPRETATIONS 
Having argued thus far that courts should defer to an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of a statute’s geographic scope, this Article 
now turns briefly to consider two implications of its argument for 
changing the extraterritorial reach of statutory provisions. Section VI.A 
argues that agencies are free to change their own interpretations of a 
statutory provision’s geographic scope, just as they are free to change 
their statutory interpretations in other respects. Section VI.B argues that 
agencies are also free to interpret the geographic scope of statutory 
provisions differently than courts have done. Under existing doctrine, 
this is certainly true with respect to the interpretations of lower federal 
 
 378. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (stating 
that antitrust laws “reflect a legislative effort to redress domestic antitrust injury that foreign 
anticompetitive conduct has caused” (citations omitted)). 
 379. See supra Section III.D. 
 380. 12 U.S.C. §	1851(d)(1)(H) (2012). 
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courts, and quite possibly with respect to interpretations of the Supreme 
Court as well. 
A. Changing Agency Interpretations 
May an agency that has interpreted the geographic scope of a 
statutory provision change its interpretation and thereby expand or 
contract that provision’s extraterritorial reach? As a general matter, a 
revised agency interpretation is entitled to no less deference under 
Chevron than an original interpretation.381 Chevron itself involved a 
revised interpretation of a statute.382 Of course, an unexplained change 
might make an interpretation “arbitrary and capricious.”383 It might also 
weaken the persuasive value of an agency interpretation under 
Skidmore.384 But “if the agency adequately explains the reasons for a 
reversal of policy, ‘change is not invalidating, since the whole point of 
Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a 
statute with the implementing agency.’	”385 Indeed, Chevron suggests 
that agencies have an affirmative duty to reconsider and revise their 
statutory interpretations.386 
 
 381. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 
(2005) (“Agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s 
interpretation under the Chevron framework.”); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 
742 (1996) (“[T]he mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency position 
is not fatal.”); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984) 
(“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.”). See generally David M. 
Gossett, Comment, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretations of 
Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1997) (discussing deference to revised agency 
interpretations). Only occasionally has the Supreme Court suggested that inconsistency itself 
might be a reason for less deference. See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 
(1987) (“An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s 
earlier interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently held 
agency view.” (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976))). For an argument that agencies should be required to 
adhere to their previous interpretations, see Harold M. Greenberg, Why Agency 
Interpretations of Ambiguous Statutes Should Be Subject to Stare Decisis, 79 TENN. L. REV. 
573, 580–611 (2012). 
 382. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863 (noting that the agency had changed its interpretation of 
the word “source”). 
 383. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46–57 (1983)); Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742. 
 384. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“The weight of such a 
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, 
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”); see also United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (quoting this passage from Skidmore). 
 385. Brand X, 545 U.S. at 981 (quoting Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742). 
 386. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64 (“On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed 
rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a 
continuing basis.”). 
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What is true for agency interpretations in general should also be 
true for agency interpretations of geographic scope. In Aramco, the 
Supreme Court applied the normal rules on revised agency 
interpretations to the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII’s geographic 
scope. Admittedly, the Court found that the EEOC’s revised 
interpretation was not entitled to Skidmore deference, but that was 
because—consistent with the normal rules387—the agency “offer[ed] no 
basis in its experience for the change.”388 Nowhere did the Court suggest 
that it was treating the revised interpretation less deferentially because it 
had changed the statute’s geographic scope specifically. 
Certainly, an agency may decide not to change its interpretation of 
a statutory provision’s geographic scope over time. HSR’s “foreign 
commerce” exemptions have remained substantively the same since 
1978, even as Congress amended the act’s statutory thresholds.389 On the 
other hand, the geographic scope that the SEC has given to the 
registration requirements of the Securities Act has evolved. Some of that 
evolution occurred prior to Regulation S, in no-action letters issued 
under Securities Act Release No. 4708.390 But Regulation S made further 
changes in existing SEC practice.391 As a reason for adopting the revised 
regulation, the SEC cited changes in international securities markets 
such as “the significant increase in offshore offerings of securities, as 
well as the significant participation by U.S. investors in foreign 
markets.”392 Looking to the future, it is certainly possible that the 
geographic scope of the Volcker Rule might be revisited, assuming that 
Congress does not decide to repeal the rule completely.393 Revised 
interpretations of geographic scope must, of course, be reasonable. They 
 
 387. See supra note 384 and accompanying text. 
 388. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991). 
 389. See supra notes 317–24 and accompanying text. 
 390. Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers; Registration of Underwriters 
as Broker-Dealers, Securities Act Release No. 4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828, 9828 (July 9, 1964); 
see Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, Exchange Release No. 27,942; 
Investment Company Act Release No. 17,458, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306, 18,308 (April 24, 1990) 
(describing application of Release 4708 in no-action letters). 
 391. See Offshore Offers and Sales, 55 Fed. Reg. at 18,316 (“Unlike no-action letters 
pursuant to Release 4708, U.S. residency rather than U.S. citizenship is the principal factor in 
the test of a natural person’s status as a U.S. person under Regulation S.”); id. at 18,318 (“The 
offering restrictions	.	.	.	have been modified from those developed in no-action letters under 
Release 4708.”). 
 392. See id. at 18,308. 
 393. See Gina Chon, Dodd-Frank Rollback May Fall Short of G.O.P. Hopes, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/business/dealbook/dodd-frank-rollback-
may-fall-short-of-gop-hopes.html (predicting that “the rewrite of Dodd-Frank will probably 
be less than sweeping,” but noting that the Volcker Rule “could be softened or abandoned”). 
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should also be explained.394 But so long as these requirements are met, 
agencies are free to expand or contract the geographic scope of a 
statutory provision by changing their interpretations. 
B. Changing Court Interpretations 
Agencies are free not only to change their own interpretations of a 
statutory provision’s geographic scope but also to depart from the 
interpretations that federal courts applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality have made. In Brand X, the Supreme Court held that 
Chevron’s application “does not depend on the order in which the 
judicial and administrative constructions occur.”395 The Court explained 
that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency 
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior 
court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous 
terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”396 If 
Brand X applies to Supreme Court decisions,397 and if the presumption 
against extraterritoriality properly applies at Chevron step two, then it 
seems clear that the SEC could interpret the geographic scope of §	10(b) 
differently than Morrison did, so long as the SEC’s interpretation were 
reasonable.398 The SEC could, for example, simply by adopting a 
regulation, reinstate the conduct and effects tests for securities fraud 
that the Supreme Court discarded in Morrison.399 
Morrison did not hold that Congress had unambiguously addressed 
the geographic scope of §	10(b). To the contrary, Morrison held that 
Congress had not unambiguously addressed the geographic scope of 
§	10(b),400 which in turn made it necessary for the Court to determine the 
 
 394. See supra notes 383–84 and accompanying text. 
 395. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005). 
 396. Id. at 982. 
 397. See infra note 407 and accompanying text. 
 398. For discussion of different ways in which courts might address the reasonableness 
question, see supra Section V.B. 
 399. In Dodd-Frank, Congress attempted to reverse Morrison and reinstate the conduct 
and effects tests with respect to government enforcement actions by amending §	27 of the 
Securities Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. §	78aa(b) (2012). One court has questioned whether 
this amendment was effective because Congress amended the Exchange Act’s jurisdictional 
provision rather than §	10(b) itself. See SEC v. Chi. Convention Ctr., LLC, 961 F. Supp. 2d 
905, 909–17 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Of course, the SEC might read Congress’s decision not to 
reinstate the conduct and effects tests with respect to private enforcement actions as a signal 
that it should not do so by regulation. 
 400. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010) (concluding “there is no 
affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that §	10(b) applies extraterritorially”). 
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focus of the statute.401 Section 10(b) expressly gives the SEC authority to 
prescribe “rules and regulations	.	.	.	necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors,”402 and the Court has 
held that SEC interpretations of this provision are entitled to deference 
at Chevron step two if they are reasonable.403 It is true that the Court did 
not defer to the SEC’s interpretation of §	10(b)’s geographic scope in 
Morrison, but that was because “the Commission did not purport to be 
providing its own interpretation of the statute, but relied on decisions of 
federal courts,”404 disqualifying its interpretation from deference at 
Chevron step zero.405 If the SEC were to exercise its delegated authority 
and issue regulations providing that §	10(b) applies whenever there is 
significant conduct in the United States or substantial effects in the 
United States,406 those regulations should be entitled to Chevron 
deference so long as they were reasonable. 
Of course, whether the SEC could depart from Morrison’s 
interpretation depends on whether Brand X applies to Supreme Court 
decisions, a question that the Supreme Court has yet to decide. Brand X 
involved judicial construction by a lower court, and Justice Stevens 
cautioned that the Court’s reasoning “would not necessarily be 
applicable” to a decision by the Supreme Court.407 But whatever the 
Court eventually decides with respect to its own decisions, Brand X 
clearly establishes that administrative agencies are free to interpret the 
geographic scope of statutes they administer in ways that diverge from 
the interpretations of lower federal courts. 
 
 401. Id. at 266 (“[W]e think that the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place 
where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in the United 
States.”). 
 402. 15 U.S.C. §	78j(b). 
 403. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819–20 (2002). 
 404. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 272 (citing In re U.S. Sec. Clearing Corp., 52 S.E.C. 92, 95 n.14, 
96 n.16 (1994); In re Robert F. Lynch, Exchange Act Release No. 11,737, 8 SEC Docket 75, 78 
n. 15 (Oct. 15, 1975)). 
 405. See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 521–22 (2009) (declining to defer to agency 
interpretation when agency mistakenly considered itself bound by judicial precedent). 
 406. These are essentially the tests that Congress tried to adopt after Morrison for 
government enforcement actions. See supra note 399. If the SEC were to adopt these tests by 
regulation, it could similarly limit them to government enforcement actions or could expand 
them to suits by private parties, since the regulations would rest not on any delegation in the 
Dodd-Frank Act but on the original delegation of rulemaking authority in §	10(b). 
 407. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 
(2005) (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court had an opportunity to resolve this question in 
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012), but the plurality 
concluded that the Court’s pre-Chevron interpretation of the statute had removed the 
ambiguity, id. at 1843 (plurality opinion), while the dissenters thought that Congress’s 
subsequent amendment of the statute had created a gap for the agency to fill, id. at 1852 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
Sometimes, courts have no choice but to interpret the geographic 
scope of federal statutes for themselves. The presumption against 
extraterritoriality gives courts a tool to avoid unnecessary conflict with 
foreign interests, while considering the focus of congressional concern. 
The Supreme Court’s two-step framework provides significant guidance 
to courts on how to apply the presumption. 
But courts need not always go it alone. Many statutes with potential 
extraterritorial applications are administered by federal agencies. These 
agencies bring expertise to questions of geographic scope that courts 
lack. Agencies are better at understanding the purposes of the statute, 
the range of regulatory options available to effectuate those purposes, 
and the potential conflicts with other nations that each of these options 
presents. Moreover, agencies may adopt more fine-grained regulatory 
schemes that maximize the achievement of statutory purposes while 
minimizing conflicts with other nations. HSR, Regulation S, and the 
Volcker Rule offer just three examples of detailed regulatory schemes 
that courts would never have attempted to fashion on their own. 
Of course, the fact that an agency has interpreted the geographic 
scope of a statute does not mean that courts have no role to play. A 
court must review an agency’s interpretation to make sure that it is 
reasonable under Chevron or persuasive under Skidmore. In doing so, a 
court should not require that the agency itself apply the presumption 
against extraterritoriality as a court would do. But a court should require 
that the agency consider the normative values that underlie the 
presumption, particularly the need to avoid unnecessary conflicts with 
foreign nations, taking into account both the statutory purposes and the 
regulatory options. Courts should consider whether an agency’s 
interpretation of a provision’s geographic scope is reasonable even if the 
statute contains a clear indication of extraterritoriality. 
Extraterritorial regulation is often complex and sensitive. Courts 
should not give agencies a blank check. But courts should also not 
presume that they are better positioned than agencies to make the many 
complex judgments that extraterritorial regulation requires. Appropriate 
deference to administrative agencies may well require courts to accept 
interpretations of geographic scope that depart from those a court would 
reach—or has already reached—by applying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. 
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